tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-94196422024-03-19T01:48:43.770-07:00Ninth Circuit BlogSteve Kalarhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/01468744334490974447noreply@blogger.comBlogger2639125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-91525622955413147552023-04-28T11:37:00.001-07:002023-04-28T11:37:17.905-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">US v. Ramos</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">,
No. 21-10184 (4-10-23)(Owens w/Bybee; Collins partial dissent and partial
concurrence)(Note: This is an AZ FPD case). </span>This appeal concerns a denial of a
motion to suppress statements as involuntary and, pertinent, whether the
district court properly adopted the magistrate’s report part and parcel
(including a key factual error and credibility determination) without
conducting an independent de novo review. The majority, over a dissent, finds
the district court did not abuse its discretion by wholly adopting the
magistrates’ record and recommendation finding the statements were not
involuntary, despite the defendant alleging he was threatened and coerced. The 9th writes the court did what the Federal
Magistrate Act allows. When a district court states, on the record, it
conducted such a review, the 9th takes it at face value, unless there is an
error of law or apparent contradiction. Collins, dissenting on this issue,
would find this district court might not have conducted such a review given his
track record (concerns expressed in the past), and the sense that the same
templates have been repeatedly used. The dissent points out the absence of any
case specific or distinct facts in the order. The dissent uses the term
“rubberstamp” for the 41/2 pages. (“Rubber Stamp” is defined as a person or
organization that gives automatic approval or authorization to the decisions of
others, without proper consideration).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">A valiant effort by Elizabeth Kruschek, AFPD, AZ
(Phoenix)<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The decision is here:<o:p></o:p></span></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 18.6667px; line-height: 107%;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/04/10/21-10184.pdf</span></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-52847742786384445052023-03-16T09:52:00.001-07:002023-03-16T09:52:07.500-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">US v. Salazar</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">,
No. 22-50060 (3-8-23)(Tallman w/Schroeder & Ikuta).</span> This is a significant “safety valve”
decision. On the government’s appeal, the 9th vacated a sentence and remanded
for resentencing because the sentencing court did not make a finding under 18
U.S.C. § 3553(f)(5) for “safety valve” relief from a mandatory minimum sentence
that the defendant had complied with the statutory proffer requirement. The
defendant relied upon the lengthy factual basis in the plea agreement (conspiracy
to distribute drugs in the LA County Jail system) to argue he gave all the
information he had. The 9th writes that
the court, on the record, could not assume the defendant had truthfully
disclosed all the information he had about the drug conspiracy. The finding it would have been “futile” is
not supported and the court’s conclusion that the prosecution already had all
the information the defendant could have provided did not excuse or obviate the
need for this finding. There is not a “implicit proffer” or “futile exception”
to the statutory requirement of a proffer. In practical terms, the defendant
needs to show they met or gave all the truthful information through an oral or
written proffer or a like opportunity. The plea’s factual basis on this record
does not suffice.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/03/08/22-50060.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-38276597841390253422023-03-16T09:49:00.003-07:002023-03-16T09:49:22.578-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">US v. Taylor</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 12pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">,
No. 21-10377 (3-1-23)(Bress w/VanDyke & Restani).</span> This is about a car stop
and whether the car stop was unreasonably prolonged. The 9th holds it was not.
The defendant here was stopped for driving without a license plate or
registration. The officers asked him if he had weapons (the defendant said
“no”) and whether he had been arrested before (yes). The officers asked the
defendant to get out of the car. The 9th states the asking of the defendant to
get out of the car did not unreasonably prolong the stop; neither did running
of a criminal records check. Also, the defendant had an unzipped fanny pack,
which was reasonable to question given the lack of identification and the fact
the defendant was under supervised release. Defendant’s consent to search the
car was not forced. The case was remanded to conform the written judgment of a
SR condition with the oral pronouncement (pay for programs if the defendant had
the ability).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/03/01/21-10377.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-71894314887395717792023-03-16T09:47:00.006-07:002023-03-16T09:47:36.956-07:00<p></p><p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">1. <i>US v. Alvarez</i>, No 21-50088 (2-16-2023)(R.
Nelson w/M. Smith & Drain).</span> The 9th affirms a 1326 conviction. The
defendant’s prior Ohio assault conviction under Ohio Rev Stat 2903.13(a) is a
COV. The 9th follows the 6th Circuit.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/02/16/21-50088.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">2. <i>US v. Farias-Contreras</i>, No. 21-30055
(2-15-23)(Wardlaw w/Gould; dissent by Bennett). </span>The prosecutor agreed to
recommend a low-end GL sentence. However, the prosecutor undermines the
recommendation with an inflammatory sentencing memorandum decrying the harm and
pain drug trafficking visited on the community by “pumping poison” to the
streets. The majority, under plain error, concludes the inflammatory statements
violated the plea agreement.<span style="mso-spacerun: yes;"> </span>Bennett
dissents. He argues the prosecutor complied by stating the recommendation, and
as expressly permitted by the plea, could present other facts. Bennett
concludes by calling for en banc or SCOTUS review.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/02/15/21-30055.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">3. <i>US v. Michell</i>, No. 19-10059
(2-15-23)(Wardlaw w/Garner; partial concurrence and dissent by Baker).</span> This is
a <i>Rehaif </i>issue. Under plain error, the 9th affirmed convictions for
unlawful firearm possession. The error was plain – knowledge of a felony is an
element – but here the 9th could take judicial notice outside the record of
other convictions, where the knowledge of felonies was clear. No prejudice
existed. Baker dissents. He argues the defendant had a fighting chance of
arguing to the jury he really didn’t know. <o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 12.0pt; line-height: 107%;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2023/02/15/19-10059.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></p><br /><p></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-55217537014404573682022-10-31T11:44:00.001-07:002022-10-31T11:44:56.014-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">1.
<i>US v. Richards</i>, No. 21-10190 (10-31-22)(Callahan w/Bybee & Collins).</span> The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">
affirms two consecutive 24-month sentences for SR violations. The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">
rejected the argument that SR violations for criminal conduction should be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt and not preponderance. Justice Breyer’s
controlling concurrence in <i>Haymond</i> still rules the day; the 9th rejected this
in previous precedent; and all other circuits have rejected this argument. The
consecutive sentences are supported by the actions of two distinct offenses, at
different places and times (possession of a firearm and ammunition). The
sentences also flow from two distinct counts in the underlying indictment.
Last, the violation and sentences are supported by sufficient evidence.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/10/31/21-10190.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/10/31/21-10190.pdf</a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">2. <i>In
re Jane Doe</i>, No. 22-70098 (Graber w/Friedland & Koh). </span>The 9<sup>th</sup>
reiterates that a defendant may agree to restitution in a plea agreement even
where there is otherwise no statutory authority for it.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/10/25/22-70098.pdf" style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif; font-size: 18pt;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/10/25/22-70098.pdf</a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"> </span><span style="font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-9506840353560422722022-10-28T15:23:00.000-07:002022-10-28T15:23:00.918-07:00<p><i>US v. Holguin</i>, No. 19-50158 (10-13-22)(Nguyen w/Bea;
partial concurrence/partial dissent by Berzon).
It would be “prudent” to test expert witnesses under <i>Daubert</i>, especially
with such expertise as gangs and when the experts were law enforcement. Such testing did not occur in this Mexican
Mafia case when the “experts” were just
lay witnesses and officers. Yet the 9th
affirmed under plain error because of
the harmlessness. Other issues include dual role of law enforcement as experts and lay witnesses, adequacy of
jury instructions about how to use such testimony, and gang evidence.</p><p class="MsoPlainText"><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoPlainText">Berzon dissents on the harmlessness of introducing drug
jargon expert testimony.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoPlainText"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/10/13/19-50158.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/10/13/19-50158.pdf</a></p><p class="MsoPlainText"><o:p></o:p></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-39986345360392846332022-10-28T15:20:00.001-07:002022-10-28T15:20:19.526-07:00<p><i>US
v. Saelee</i>, No. 20-10209 (10/11/22)(Collins w/Nguyen & Burgess). The 9th
affirmed convictions for attempted possession of ecstasy and conspiracy. The
9th find the “independent source” doctrine permitted evidence to come in
despite 4th amendment violations (the warrant was issued minutes after the
violations based on previous information). The 9th also held evidence was
sufficient evidence to support the convictions. Co-conspirator statements were
not hearsay and admission of other evidence, such as showing a photo of a wad
of money, and testimony about ammunition, were not erroneous nor
prejudicial. </p><p>The decision is here:</p><p>https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/10/11/20-10209.pdf</p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-34773182608198951782022-09-25T16:18:00.000-07:002022-09-25T16:18:00.949-07:00<p><span style="color: #2b00fe;">1. US v. Chen, No. 20-50333 (9-14-22)(Navarro w/Rawlinson & Christen). </span>“We hold that a district court may consider the First Step’s non-retroactive changes to sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual defendant, when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).” p. 3.</p><p>The issue was stacked 924(c)s. The sentencing court can consider the change in law.</p><p>Congrats to Joshua Weiss & Kathryn Young, Deputy FPDs, Cal C (L.A.).</p><p>https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/14/20-50333.pdf</p><p><span style="color: #2b00fe;">2. US v. Fowler, No. 21-30172 (9-13-22)(Miller w/Ikuta & Pregerson). </span>Affirming denial of a suppression motion, the 9th upheld the cross-deputization of a Montana state trooper to enforce tribal law when there is a gap in the jurisdictions. The trooper stopped the defendant, an Indian, on a highway cutting through the reservation. The cross-deputization agreement was valid. The fact the deputy did not carry an identification card which clearly violates the agreement did not rise to a serious enough violation to cause the sovereign parties to seek a remedy.</p><p>https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/13/21-30172.pdf</p><p><span style="color: #2b00fe;">3. US v. Montoya, No. 21-50129 (9-13-22)(Lee w/Ikuta; concurrence by Forrest).</span> The 9th wouldn’t let appellant withdraw her guilty plea. The appellant argued the court’s saying it “rejected” a non-binding sentencing recommendation transformed the plea to an 11(c)(1)(C). “No,” says the 9th; the word didn’t make it what it wasn’t. The 9th also held failing to orally recite the standard conditions was not err. US v Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir 2006) does not require it. At the COP colloquy, the court’s failure to say the defendant had a right to a jury trial did not affect her rights. Concurring, Forrest regards Napier as wrong. The “standard” conditions are too broad a definition.</p><p>https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/13/21-50129.pdf</p><div><br /></div>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-15369703472770170832022-09-05T14:40:00.000-07:002022-09-05T14:40:19.560-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">1.
<i>US v. Latu</i>, No. 19-10069 (Nguyen w/Wardlaw & Owens).</span> The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">
affirms a conviction for Assault resulting in serious bodily injury that
occurred at a federal detention center. The victim, also a detainee, refused to
testify. His statements as to the injuries and pain came in, over a <i>Crawford</i>
confrontation objection, because the statements fit into a hearsay exception
(medical treatment) and they were given in medical treatment as opposed to
questioning or law enforcement. This was true even though the medical nurse was
a BOP employee. The primary purpose was treatment for traumatic injuries and
medical care. Of note, the 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> emphatically states it is not
adopting a categorical rule or presumption that all statements to medical staff
or during treatment is admissible and not <i>Crawford</i> barred. The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">
emphasizes sometimes, the statements are testimonial and subject to <i>Crawford</i>.
The factors here are the role of the nurse (treatment and not questioning), the
trauma, and the informality.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/31/19-10069.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/31/19-10069.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">2.
<i>Wright v. Alaska</i>, No. 19-35543 (8-31-22)(Murguia w/Nelson; concurrence by
Rawlinson).</span> Custody on a failure to register as a sex offender charge is
not “custody” for habeas jurisdiction to challenge underlying state convictions
that gave rise to the requirement to register. The Supreme Court dealt with the
argument in <i>Alaska v. Wright</i>, 141 S. Ct 1467 (2021). Petitioner’s attempt here
to argue a “restraint-on-liberty” condition by registration also fails. He was
not in custody. Rawlinson concurs, stating the Court’s per curium decision
dealt with both theories and the “rehash’ in this opinion was not necessary.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/31/19-35543.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/31/19-35543.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-70199835189435406452022-09-05T14:22:00.000-07:002022-09-05T14:22:03.118-07:00<p><span style="font-size: large;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;"><i>US
v. Anderson</i>, No. 20-50207 (8-25-22)(Rawlinson w/Owens; dissent by Fletcher).</span>
The 9th considers whether a contracted private security guard threatened by
defendant is an “official” under 18 USC 115 through a cross reference to 1114
which extends to those assisting officials. The majority says “yes,”
while acknowledging the ambiguity and confusion in the statute. The majority
concludes the term “official” in 115 is not meant as a limitation. The dissent,
Fletcher, says: yes it should. The statute is ambiguous and the language must
be read as a limitation. It should not apply to this guard as an “official.”
The Rule 29 should be granted. The majority joins the 3rd and 8th Circuits.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">Interesting
statutory issue and one that may have appeal to SCOTUS.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: large;">Righteous
fight by Gia Kim, Deputy Public Defender, Cal Central (Los Angeles). </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/25/20-50207.pdf"><span style="font-size: large;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/25/20-50207.pdf</span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="mso-fareast-font-family: "Times New Roman";"><o:p><span style="font-size: large;"> </span></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-28058905268591840952022-09-05T14:19:00.000-07:002022-09-05T14:19:08.260-07:00<p><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">1. <i>Nguyen v.
Frauenheim</i>, No. 20-56284 (8-22-22)(M. Smith w/Bade & VanDyke). </span></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18pt;">The 9</span><sup style="color: windowtext;">th</sup><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18pt;">
affirms denial of a habeas petition, finding no <i>Batson</i> violation. The <i>Batson</i>
challenge went to gender and mixed race. The 9</span><sup style="color: windowtext;">th</sup><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18pt;"> reiterates that
<i>Teague</i> bars new rules being established in habeas. As such, looking at a class
of Hispanic women would be a new class (Hispanic and gender). There was also no
<i>Batson</i> violation as to the Hispanic juror.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/22/20-56284.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/22/20-56284.pdf</a></span><span style="color: #0070c0; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">2. <i>US v.
Ramirez-Ramirez</i>, No. 21-10127 (8-22-22)(Paez w/Hawkins & Watford).</span></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"> Summary
by Ryan Moore, AFPD (Appeals), D. AZ, who argued the case: “The CA9 holds on
plain error that the 6A public-trial right applies to the phase of announcing
guilt in a bench trial. Only the CA2 so held previously. The district court
announced its findings of guilt about a week after the bench trial only in
writing, while the defendant sat in jail. The panel held that the 6A requires
findings of guilt be made in open court, even when the factfinder is the judge.
Although the panel also held that the district court’s later reiteration of </span><span style="font-size: 18.0pt;">its findings at sentencing satisfied the 6A’s
open-court requirement</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;">,
it nonetheless remanded for specific findings of fact because the district
court had denied as untimely a request for specific findings made after the
written announcement of guilt, which was</span><span style="font-size: 18.0pt;">
“legally insufficient.”</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;">
Unfortunately, the plain error standard doomed what the panel called “</span><span style="font-size: 18.0pt;">a strong argument” that the guilt by email scheme also
violated</span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"> the rights to
be present under the 5A and Rule 43(a). And we really should have gotten a new
trial for the 6A violation, in my opinion, because a mere reiteration at
sentencing of a decision made long after the judge has moved on is not a
substitute for the moment of truth when the judge faces a defendant in trial
and makes/announces the decision in open court. But the caselaw isn’t great on
the remedy for this structural error and a new trial was always a longshot.</span><span style="font-size: 18.0pt;">”<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/22/21-10127.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/22/21-10127.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">3. <i>US v.
Jaimez</i>, No. 19-50253 (8-23-22)(Bress w/Fitzwater; Concurrence/dissent by
Owens).</span></span><span style="color: windowtext; font-size: 18.0pt;"> The 9<sup>th</sup> affirms convictions for RICO, money laundering, and
conspiracy. There was sufficient evidence. Owens dissents on money laundering,
arguing the defendant, a low level “foot soldier,” did not know the purpose of
the money laundering actions was to conceal financial transactions.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: #2b00fe;"><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 24px;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/23/19-50253.pdf</span></span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-8921369328372787782022-09-05T14:12:00.002-07:002022-09-05T14:12:59.143-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">Crespin
v. Ryan, No. 18-15073 (8-19-22)(Hurwitz w/Hawkins & M. Smith).</span> The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">
affirms a conditional grant of habeas. This presents a </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Miller</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> claim,
narrowed under </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Jones v. Mississippi</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">, 141 S. Ct 1307 (2021). Petitioner
was 16 when charged with a capital offense. He pled to LWOP, pre-</span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Miller</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">.
The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> held he could challenge post-conviction. The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">
then held that </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Miller</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> and </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Jones </i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">both require the court to
exercise its discretion. Here, the trial court stated he had no discretion in
sentencing and had to impose LWOP. The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> rejects the State’s
argument that the court could have rejected the plea. Rejection is not
discretion in sentencing, and did not comply with </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Miller</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/19/18-15073.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/19/18-15073.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-19235685134897728712022-09-05T14:11:00.000-07:002022-09-05T14:11:35.003-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">1.
US v. Rodriguez, No. 21-50108 (8-17-22)(M. Smith w/Bade; concurrence by
VanDyke). </span>The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> remands for resentencing. In sentencing for
importation, the court erred in denying a minor role adjustment by misapplying
the factors set out in 3B1.2(b). In denying the adjustment, the court failed to
recognize the comparison is with an average participant in a particular
conspiracy or enterprise; failed to consider a recruiter’s culpability in
luring the defendant; failed to consider the degree of involvement in the
factors; and failed to consider the totality of circumstances. The court tended
to have a stark choice about applicability. Upon resentencing, as to
certain factors, the 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> instructs the court to focus on the scope
of defendant’s knowledge of the entire criminal enterprise (which was limited);
the fact he was paid a discrete amount rather than a percentage; and the
receiving of instructions does not mean one plans or organizations conduct.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Concurring,
VanDyke agrees with the remand. He writes to stress a court can consider
evidence beyond the five factors listed in 3B1.2(b). He also states that
running large quantities of drugs across the border can indicate a knowledge of
participants involved.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">This
is a good case for use of “minor role” and the factored approach.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><br /></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/17/21-50108.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/17/21-50108.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="color: #2b00fe; font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">2.
US v. Carter, No. 19-10411(8-17-22)(Bea w/Murguia & Berzon).</span><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"> This is a
First Step Act issue about what changes and facts can be considered in using
discretion to reduce a sentence in resentencing. The 9</span></span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">th</sup><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"> states that
</span></span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Concepcion v US</i><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;">, 142 S. Ct 2389 (2022) allows (1) district courts to
examine intervening changes in the law or fact in exercising discretion in
reducing a sentence; (2) the court must consider nonfrivolous arguments in
exercising discretion, and so changes of fact can be considered; and (3) the
court must explain its reasoning. The 9</span></span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">th</sup><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"> holds </span></span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Concepcion</i><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;">
abrogates 9</span></span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">th</sup><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"> </span><span style="font-size: 24px;">precedent</span><span style="font-size: 18pt;"> in </span></span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">US v. Kelly</i><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;">, 962 F. 3d 470 (9</span></span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">th</sup><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;">
Cir. 2020). </span></span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Kelly</i><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"> limited the First Step Act to sections 2 and 3 of the
Fair Sentencing Act and the changes there. </span></span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Concepcion</i><span style="font-family: Times New Roman, serif;"><span style="font-size: 18pt;"> expands the scope.<o:p></o:p></span></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Congrats
to David Porter, AFPD, Cal E (Sacramento).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/17/19-10411.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/17/19-10411.pdf</a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-37034026296566219412022-09-05T14:06:00.001-07:002022-09-05T14:06:44.764-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;"><i>US
v. Magdaleno</i>, No. 20-10390 (8-11-22)(Clifton w/M. Smith & Reiss).</span> Siblings
don’t qualify as an “intimate familial relationship”? At least not under plain
error, and on this record, which involves a SR condition for the defendant, a
member of the East Las Casitas </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Norteno</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> street gang, not to associate
with fellow gang members. His siblings and half-siblings are members of the
gang. The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> considers </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Wolf Child</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">, which holds that
certain close family ties are fundamental liberty interests that need special
findings and proof. The relationship with brothers and half-brothers, on this
record, did not rise to such a relationship. The court did not procedurally err
by failing to make certain findings; and did not err in imposing this condition
on the record.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/11/20-10390.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/11/20-10390.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-89444895915408174682022-09-05T14:04:00.002-07:002022-09-05T14:04:38.517-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">1.
<i>Fauber v. Davis</i>, No. 17-99001 (8-5-22)(Bress w/Forrest; dissent by Watford).
</span>The 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> affirms denial of a capital habeas. Under AEDPA deference,
the 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> finds no IAC when counsel failed to object to prosecutorial
vouching. </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">In closing, the </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">prosecutor
read the cooperating witness’s plea agreement which state the prosecutor and
court would assess testimony for truthfulness.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">More
</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">concerning</span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">, the majority found no error in the
exclusion from mitigation the State’s plea offer to life. Petitioner sought to
introduce to counter the argument of future dangerousness. The majority
concludes there is no clearly established federal constitutional law that holds
an unaccepted plea is mitigating evidence. Even if it were, the majority
concludes exclusion was not prejudicial.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Dissenting,
Watford points to the need to counter the prosecutor’s full-throated argument
the petitioner would kill again if given LWOP. Watford argues federal law
is clear on this point and it is not harmless.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">Righteous
fight by Deputy Fed Defenders John Crouchley & Ajay Kusnoor, Cal Central
(Los Angeles).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/05/17-99001.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/05/17-99001.pdf</a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">2.
<i>Montiel v. Chappell</i>, No. 15-99000 (Friedland w/Fletcher & Hurwitz)(8-5-22).</span>
The 9<sup>th</sup> affirms denial of a petitioner for IAC under AEDPA
deference. The 9<sup>th</sup> concludes, again, the state supreme court’s
summary denial of a review petition was on the merits. Even assuming counsel
was IAC for failing to present expert evidence of diminished capacity due to
substance abuse and a history of substance abuse, the state court was
reasonable in finding there was no prejudice.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/05/15-99000.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/05/15-99000.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-12035407712209211752022-08-17T17:24:00.001-07:002022-08-17T17:24:06.848-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;"><i>US
v. Brown</i>, No. 20-50313 (8-2-22)(Daniels w/McKeown & Ikuta).</span> After such
knowledge, what forgive? Sure, </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">a bit </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">poetic,
but it comes into play with this “safety valve” defendant and the First Step
Act. The First Step Act proscribes using information in a safety valve </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">proffer from </span><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">enhancing a sentence. The defendant
gave a safety valve proffer, which disclosed other drug courier trips. The
court referenced this as part of the 3553 factors, along with other
information, in sentencing the defendant to a 78 month sentence: below the
mandatory minimum and below the guidelines range, but higher than the
government recommendation (71 months) and what the defendant wanted. The court
focused on a variety of factors, including use of a minor in the transport, the
length of involvement with the traffickers, the impact on the community, and
the earning of considerable sums. The case thus turns on “enhancing.”</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;">As
a first impression, the 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 18pt;"> holds the sentence was not improper. A
failure to reduce a sentence is not an enhancement. [The opinion cites
extensive authority that a failure to reduce is not an enhancement.] The court
considered a variety of factors – aggravating and mitigating – in fashioning
this sentence. The First Step Act does not strip the court of the ability to
consider the information in its sentencing discretion.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 18.0pt;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/02/20-50313.pdf">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/02/20-50313.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-89973180618193358582022-08-17T17:21:00.001-07:002022-08-17T17:21:12.630-07:00<p><span style="color: #2b00fe;"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">1.
</span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">United States v. Wright</i></span><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">, No. 20-50361 (Bennett (D. Md.) with Berzon and
Bea) </span>–- The panel affirmed the denial of a motion for a sentence reduction
under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), holding that error in treating the
Guidelines’s policy statement on compassionate release as binding can be
harmless when the district court makes an alternative ruling based on the 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors that is itself a proper exercise of sentencing
discretion. The panel also held that the defendant had abandoned his
alternative request for home confinement by failing to separately argue it.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Kudos to
Jessica Agatstein and Katie Hurrelbrink, Federal Defenders of San Diego, for a
hard-fought appeal.</span><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;"> </span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook",serif;">The
decision is here:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/29/20-50361.pdf" style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/29/20-50361.pdf</a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook",serif;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook",serif;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">2.
<i>Sansing v. Shinn</i>, No. 13-99001 (Watford with Callahan; Berzon
dissenting) </span>–- [This is an Arizona CHU case.] The panel denied a petition
for rehearing and issued a revised opinion and revised dissent that does not
change the previous outcome of the appeal (no relief, but Berzon dissented and
would order resentencing) but accounts for the Supreme Court’s recent ruling in
<i>Brown v. Davenport</i>, 142 S. Ct. 1510 (2022), which discusses how to apply
harmless-error review (here, to a claim under <i>Ring v. Arizona</i>, 536 U.S.
584 (2002)) in habeas proceedings. The panel did not allow further
petitions for rehearing based on the revised opinion and dissent.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">The
revised opinion is here:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/29/13-99001.pdf" style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/29/13-99001.pdf</a></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-57654481172883266442022-07-25T07:44:00.002-07:002022-07-25T07:44:09.950-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook",serif;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">Creech
v. Richardson</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">,
No. 10-99105 (W. Fletcher with Bybee and Christen)</span> –- The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the denial of an Idaho state prisoner’s habeas petition, in which he
challenged a death sentence imposed at resentencing following <i>Creech v.
Arave</i>, 947 F.2d 873 (9th Cir. 1991), <i>rev’d in part</i>, 507 U.S. 463
(1993).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">The
district court had certified discrete portions of the petitioner’s claim of IAC
at sentencing for failing to present mitigating evidence. Under </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Browning
v. Baker</i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">, 875 F.3d 444 (9th Cir. 2017), the petitioner asked the court to
broaden the COA to include the entire claim. The court declined to do so,
reasoning that the district court had effectively complied with the directive
in </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Browning </i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">to “craft” the COA at “a higher level of generality.”
Plus, the district court had reexamined other parts of the claim when the case
was remanded for further proceedings in light of </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Martinez v. Ryan</i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">, 566
U.S. 1 (2012).</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">The
Idaho Supreme Court’s conclusion that absent mitigating evidence at
resentencing did not affect the outcome of the proceeding was reasonable.
Resentencing took place before the same judge who had originally imposed the
death sentence, and he took judicial notice of the evidence presented at the
first sentencing hearing. The only new evidence presented at resentencing
related to the petitioner’s childhood sexual abuse. Given the aggravated
nature of the killing, this new evidence and other evidence that was allegedly
absent from the resentencing would not have affected the outcome.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Because
of </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Shinn v. Ramirez</i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">, 142 S. Ct. 1718 (2022), the district court could
not consider new evidence presented for the first time in federal court under </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Martinez</i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">.
But even if it could, the court ruled that it would not have changed the
outcome of the resentencing hearing.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">The
district court had dismissed some claims as subject to the second or successive
petition bar. The court reversed the dismissal of those claims but,
instead of remanding them for consideration by the district court on the
merits, addressed the merits of those claims and denied them. These
claims related to the validity of the underlying murder conviction, which the
petitioner was permitted to challenge for a second time under </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Magwood v.
Patterson</i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">, 561 U.S. 320 (2010). These claims went to a potential
conflict of interest in the public defender’s office and the trial court’s
decision to deny the petitioner’s request to withdraw his guilty plea.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">The
court denied the petitioner’s request for a remand under </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Lackey v. Texas</i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">,
514 U.S. 1045 (1995), in light of the four decades that the peittioner has
spent on death row.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Finally,
the court denied the petitioner’s request to file replacement briefs in the
wake of </span><i style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">Ramirez</i><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">, because that decision did not affect the court’s
treatment of the claims in the appeal.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">The
decision is here:</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/20/10-99015.pdf" style="font-family: "Century Schoolbook", serif;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/20/10-99015.pdf</a></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-27146921695445859412022-07-22T15:44:00.003-07:002022-07-22T15:44:41.171-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">US v. Bastide-Hernandez</span></span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt; line-height: 107%;"><span style="color: #2b00fe;">,
No. 19-30006 (7-11-22)(en banc)(Owens; Concurrence by Friedland; Partial
concurrence and dissent by Collins).</span> Addressing whether a “Notice to Appear”
(NTA) is jurisdictional in the context of a 1326 charge and an attack on the
prior removal, the 9th writes: “Consistent with our own precedent and that of
every other circuit to consider this issue, we hold that the failure of an NTA
to include time and date information does not deprive the immigration court of
subject matter jurisdiction, and thus Bastide-Hernandez’s removal was not ‘void
ab initio,’ as the district court determined. We reverse the district court’s
dismissal and remand for further proceedings.”
The defects of the NTA does not bar the immigration court from having
jurisdiction. The requirements are more of a “claims processing” rule rather
than a bar to the immigration court’s adjudicatory jurisdiction.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Friedland’s concurrence urges the government to abide
by and confirm with the statutory requirements for the NTA.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Collins objects to note 10, which instructs the
district court to reconsider its 1326(d) analysis, given US v.
Palomar-Santiago, 141 S. Ct. 1615 (2021). Collins argues that once the 9th
remands, it shouldn’t be directing the court to look at any particular issues.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">Valiant fight by Paul Shelton of the Fed Defenders of
E. Wash. (Yakima).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">The decision is here:<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/07/11/19-30006.pdf<o:p></o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-87369651393349549452022-06-29T09:31:00.004-07:002022-06-29T09:31:29.244-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">US v. David</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">, No. 20-50274 (6-15-22)(Bumatay w/Bress &
Gleason). Fed R Crim P 11(b)(1)(N) requires the court to inform the
defendant of any appellate waiver. In particular, Rule 11 requires that
the court must address the defendant personally in open court. In this appeal,
the defendant argues the failure of the court to personally address, and
inform, him of the waiver during his change of plea was cause to make the
waiver unenforceable. Under plain error, the 9<sup>th</sup> upheld the waiver.
The defendant was questioned about the plea, specifically told of the waiver,
and the plea was voluntary and informed.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/15/20-50274.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #0563c1;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/15/20-50274.pdf</span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-1475379480412752462022-06-29T09:29:00.006-07:002022-06-29T09:29:38.031-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">US v. Manaku</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">, No. 20-10069 (Per curiam w/Clifton, Nelson,
& Collins; concurrence by Collins). Fed R Crim P 41(f)(1)(c ) requires a
complete copy of a warrant to be left. It wasn’t. Only the first page was left.
Defendant argues this clear violation of Rule 41 requires suppression. The
trial court disagreed. The 9<sup>th</sup> affirms the denial of suppression.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">Despite clearly violating Rule 41, the 9</span><sup style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif;">th</sup><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"> holds denial of
suppression was not warranted. The failure was not fundamental (clear
constitutional violations). Rather, the violation was “technical,” and
suppression only occurs if (1) the defendant was prejudiced; or (2) there was a
deliberate disregard of the rule. Neither occurred here. The error was due to
carelessness.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">Concurring, Collins would find that the Supreme Court had overruled
the requirement a warrant be produced on demand, as defendant had requested
here, but only requires it to be left at the end of the search or leaving. With
that, Collins concurs in the judgment that the failure was unintentional.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/14/20-10069.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #0563c1;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/14/20-10069.pdf</span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-17890376534374895042022-06-29T09:26:00.004-07:002022-06-29T09:26:38.151-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">US v. Mathews</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">, No. 19-56110
(6-13-22)(Forrest w/Kelly & M. Smith). The petitioner gets relief under <i>Davis</i>,
139 S. Ct.2319 (2019). A conviction under 18 USC 844(i) (property-damage
destruction) is not a categorical “crime of violence” for 924c(3). The
destruction could be to one’s own property and not solely the property of
another. While the district court tried to use past precedent to divine
congressional intent (an explosive bomb seems a COV), a categorical approach
must be applied. The 9<sup>th</sup> joins the 4<sup>th</sup>, 6<sup>th</sup>,
and 10<sup>th</sup> Circuits.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">Congrats to Kara Hartzler, Fed Defs of San Diego.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/13/19-56110.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #0563c1;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/13/19-56110.pdf</span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-3261748205213643022022-06-29T09:24:00.006-07:002022-06-29T09:24:23.329-07:00<p><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">1. </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">US v. Tagatac</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">, No. 21-10133 (6-10-22)(Nelson w/Bybee &
Bolton). Hawaii’s second-degree robbery statute is divisible. Thus, the
defendant’s conviction for the robbery is a “crime of violence,” and the court
did not err in sentencing him as a career offender. Hawaii’s statute makes each
subdivision a separate offense; and jury instructions require unanimity on the
acts.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/10/21-10133.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #0563c1;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/10/21-10133.pdf</span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">2. </span><i style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">US v. Merrell</i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">, No. 20-30183 (6-10-22)(Hurwitz w/Sung;
dissent by Boggs). The First Step’s amendment of 924( c)(1) applies if a
sentence imposed before passage was vacated and remanded. The sentencing slate
had been wiped clean.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">Dissenting, Boggs argues the text does not allow retroactive
application, even if the sentence was vacated. Words, not possibly what
Congress intended, controls.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/10/20-30183.pdf" style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;"><span style="color: #0563c1;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/10/20-30183.pdf</span></a></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><span style="font-size: 14.0pt; line-height: 107%;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-48527681552185782912022-06-29T09:21:00.003-07:002022-06-29T09:21:47.550-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">US v. Mendez</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">, No. 20-30007 (6-7-22)(McKeown w/Christen
& Miller). The 9<sup>th</sup> affirms a conviction under 18 USC
2251(a), which criminalizes conduct that leads a minor to engage in sexually
explicit acts to produce a visual depiction. Here, placing a camera in the eye
of stuffed animal to film an unaware teenage girl masturbating was clear
conduct that fell within the scope of the statute. The appeal concerns “use” because
the defendant did not coerce, persuaded, or entice the victim. The 9<sup>th</sup>’s
focus is on the conduct of the defendant and not the victim. The defendant’s
acts “used” the victim. The 9<sup>th</sup> lines up with the numerous other
circuits in this perspective.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/07/20-30007.pdf"><span style="color: #0563c1;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/07/20-30007.pdf</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-9419642.post-13073513081846496192022-06-29T09:20:00.002-07:002022-06-29T09:20:10.209-07:00<p><i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">US v. Werle</span></i><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman", serif; font-size: 14pt;">, No. 20-36005 (6-3-22)(M. Smith w/Tashima
& Nguyen). In <i>Rehaif</i>, the govt must prove the defendant knew he was
a felon when he possessed a firearm. Here, the district summarily dismissed the
2255 because the court felt he did on the record. The 9th reversed. First,
petitioner can overcome procedural default given the overwhelming weight of
precedent. Second, though petitioner was sentenced previously
to more than a year in prison and acknowledged he was convicted of
felonies, such facts do not conclusively show he knew his status to the degree
needed for summary dismissal. He may not have pled guilty to being a felon in
possession had he been advised of the govt’s burden to meet the <i>Rehaif </i>knowledge
element. This is remanded for an evidentiary hearing.</span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;">Congrats to Houston Goddard of the Fed Def of E WA and Idaho
(Spokane).<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><o:p> </o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal" style="line-height: normal; margin-bottom: 0in;"><span style="font-family: "Times New Roman",serif; font-size: 14.0pt; mso-fareast-font-family: Calibri;"><a href="https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/03/20-36005.pdf"><span style="color: blue;">https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/06/03/20-36005.pdf</span></a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>Jon Sandshttp://www.blogger.com/profile/14764708457337817707noreply@blogger.com0