Three concurring judges, all urging en banc review of the decision they felt forced to deliver because
of binding (and dubious) Ninth precedent.
A rare
concurring opinion – and hopefully not the end for this decision of first
impression.
United States v. Chandler, 2014 WL 644698 (9th Cir. Feb. 20,
2013), decision available here.
Players: Per curiam decision by Judges
Bybee and Tashima and District Judge Wood.
Facts: Chandler plead open to a Section
922(g) charge. Id. at *1. He had
three Nevada priors: second degree kidnapping, coercion, and conspiracy to
commit robbery. Id. Over defense
objection, the district court found that all three priors were “violent
felonies” under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) and sentenced Chandler to 235 months imprisonment. Id.
Issue(s): “We have not previously considered
whether conspiracy to commit robbery is a violent felony.” Id. at *3. [ ] [W]e consider whether conspiracy to commit robbery
under Nevada law is a ‘violent felony’ as that term is defined in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii).” Id.
Held: “A
Nevada conviction for robbery is a violent felony because it creates a serious
risk of harm that is comparable to the risk posed by burglary [an enumerated
offense in the ACCA definition of ‘crime of violence.’] And because after [the
Ninth Circuit’s] decision in Mendez,
the § 924(e) analysis of a prior conspiracy conviction is governedt by the
substantive offense that was the object of the conspiracy, . . . conspiracy to
commit robbery, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 199.480, 200.238, is also a
‘violent felony’ under the ACCA’s residual clause.” Id. at *6 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Of Note: The Ninth also decides, as a
question of first impression, that the Nevada offense of second degree
kidnapping is categorically “crime of violence” that triggers ACCA exposure. Id. at *8.
How to
Use: The interesting aspect of this decision is not the
opinion, but Judge Bybee’s concurrence – joined by Judge Tashima and District Judge Wood. Id. at *8. Judge Bybee questions the
on-going validity of the Ninth’s 1993 decision in Mendez. He points out that the old Mendez approach proceeds from a faulty premise: it treats the
elements of conspiracy the same as
the elements of the underlying crime. Id.
at *9. Based on that bad premise, Mendez
equates conspiracy to commit robbery as an offense as dangerous as robbery –
even though conspiracy “rarely, if ever, presents a serious potential risk of
injury to another.” Id.
This old
approach doesn’t square with the Supreme Court’s ACCA analysis in James, which treated an inchoate offense
– attempted burglary – as different than
the substantive offense of burglary. Id.
As Judge Bybee observes, “until we are willing to reevaluate Mendez, offenders like Chandler will be
categorized as ‘career offenders’ based on robberies which they discussed but
not actually commit.” Id. at *10.
While he acknowledges a circuit split on whether conspiracy can be a violent
felony, Judge Bybee and his colleagues end a great concurrence by urging en banc consideration of the
questionable Mendez decision. Id. at *13.
Preserve objections to the
use of conspiracy priors as ACCA crimes of violence: with luck, an en banc court will be revising this
issue soon.
For
Further Reading: Mandatory minimums increase
disparity, by vesting too much unilateral power in the prosecutor. So argues a
Chicago Law instructor, in a study of data from thousands of federal
sentencings. See Crystal Yang, Have Inter-Judge Sentencing Disparities
Increased in an Advisory Guidelines Regime? Evidence from Booker here.
For a New Yorker
piece discussing the study, see here.
“En banc” image from http://www.craigalexander.net/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/en-banc-logo.png
.
Labels: ACCA, Bybee, Crime of Violence, Tashima