U.S. v. Rodriguez, No. 07-10217 (3-10-08). "I'm good for [this opinion]. "What does that mean? Lets change it to a response to Miranda warnings, "I'm good for tonight." Is it a waiver? Is it an invocation? It is ambiguous. As such, the police should have clarified rather than keep on questioning the defendant about a gun and silencer found in his car during a DUI stop, and to which defendant eventually admitted ownership. The district court said that it was unclear what the phrase meant, and the officers did not have to clarify because the invocation to silence had to be unambiguous. The 9th (Smith joined by Canby and Thompson) reversed, holding that the Supremes in Davis made the requirement of unambiguity apply to a prior waiver that was later equivocated. Here, there was no prior waiver and so the officers had to ascertain the meaning from the get go.
Congratulations to AFPD Jason Carr of the Nevada (Las Vegas) FPD office.
Manta v. Chertoff, No. 07-55353 (3-11-08). It's Greek to me, or at least to the petitioner, who is being extradited to Greece on charges of fraud. Extradition is primarily diplomatic, and controlled by treaties. Here, on challenges of dual criminality (a crime in both places), the 9th upheld the charges as essentially fraud in both jurisdictions. There was also sufficient probable cause and identity.
1 Comments:
The Rodriguez court's analysis seemed pretty straightforward. I'm curious how other circuits could have applied Davis differently.
California Appellate Report uses one brief reference by the opinion to the 5-4 vote in Davis to infer that the Ninth did not feel as bound by Davis as it would have if it were a unanimous opinion. (I'll bet the Supremes would be surprised to hear that.) To the extent he's right, the court's reference to the "bare majority" in Davis strikes me as totally unnecessary, because Davis is so readily distinguishable for the reasons the Ninth states.
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