Case o' The Week: Too Poor to Pay, High Sentence OK - Rangel, Restitution, and Sentencing
Carlo Pietro Giovanni Guglielmo Tebaldo Ponzi |
With thousands of eager marks desperate for relief from
foreclosure, this is a wonderful era for modern fraud artists with new spins on
old Ponzi schemes.
(Unless, of course, you happen to get
caught). United States v. Rangel,
2012 WL 4857207 (9th Cir. Oct. 15, 2012) (ord. amend. & denying
reh’g en banc), decision available here.
Players: Decision by Judge Clifton, joined by Judges Farris and
Ikuta.
Facts: Rangel defrauded lots of folks of
lots of money in a classic Ponzi scheme that included mortgage fraud. Id. at *1-*2. He pleaded guilty to a
deal wherein the parties jointly recommended 180 months of custody. Id. at *1.
The district
court busted the deal, and then varied
upwards to an above-guideline term of 264 months. Id. at *2. The district court gave no notice of its intent to
impose a sentence above the guidelines. Id.
at *4.
During the
sentencing hearing the court “inquired into Rangel’s ability to pay restitution
to his victims . . . the court was informed that Rangel was not in a position
to pay any restitution toward the victims’ losses.” Id. at *2.
Issue(s): “Rangel argues that the district
court erred in considering his inability to pay restitution to his victims in
determining his sentence.” Id. at *5.
Held: “We conclude
that the court did not abuse its discretion in considering the serious
financial impact Rangel’s crimes had on his victims.” Id. “The district court in this case did not consider Rangel’s
inability to pay restitution itself as an aggravating factor in imposing a
longer sentence, but focused instead on the impact on the victims of Rangel’s
crimes.” Id. at *6. “Consideration of
the impact on the victims was appropriate.” Id.
Of Note: This case brings to mind an
analogous spin on Acceptance of Responsibility. When we first challenged the
Acceptance Guideline, USSG § 3E.1.1, we were assured the approach was constitutional
because the guideline didn’t punish
for going to trial – it instead rewarded
pleas of guilt. (?!?) See generally
United States v. Gonzalez, 897 F.2d 1018, 1020 (9th Cir. 1990).
Here, the Ninth assures us that Rangel didn’t
receive a higher sentence because he was poor and couldn’t pay back the victims
(which would be unconstitutional). Id.
at *5. Instead, Rangel received his whopping above-guideline sentence because
the lack of restitution had a big impact on the victims – and that factor is fair game for a higher sentence. Id. at *6.
For those of us who defend indigent clients, Rangel’s distinction is a bit of a head-scratcher
–- and a close look at the amended language at the outset of this order doesn’t
do much to reassure the reader that Rangel isn't being punished for poverty.
How to
Use: Another holding of Rangel is the unsurprising conclusion
that no notice is required for an upward variance
under § 3553(a) (in contrast to
an upward departure from the
guidelines). Id. at *4. Beware that
you can get blindsided with an above-guideline sentence, with no notice, if a
district court is simply careful enough to characterize higher term as a Booker variance instead of an upward
departure. (Although, as a matter of general fairness, a district court should
voluntarily give notice of an upward variance for the same reasons it is
required for an upward departure under Fed. R. Crim. Proc. 32(g)).
For
Further Reading: Rangel was sentenced to whopping twenty-two
years in federal custody, even though he had not inflicted any violence on any
victim -- over two decades of incarceration for fraud. Id. at *1. While it appears that defense counsel did a yeoman’s
effort pitching mitigating arguments, id.
at *2, could more mitigation work have lowered this high term? Do capital counsel,
with their years of expertise in mitigation work, have lessons to teach us for white
collar defense? That’s the thesis of an interesting new piece by Professor Todd
Haugh, Can the CEO Learn from the
Condemned? The Application of Capital Mitigation Strategies to White Collar
Cases, Amer. Univ. L. Rev. Vol. 62, 2012, available here.
Image of
Charles Ponzi from http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/0/0e/Ponzi1920.jpg
Steven
Kalar, Federal Public Defender N.D. Cal. FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
.
Labels: Above-Guideline Notice, Booker, Clifton, Notice at Sentencing, Poverty, Sentencing, Substantive Reasonableness
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