Case o' The Week: If Brevity Be the Soul of Wit, a Witty Opinion indeed - Mendez-Sosa and Defining "Conviction" for Taylor analysis
Bad facts make bad law.
No facts make short opinions.
United States v. Mendez-Sosa, 2015 WL 868560 (9th Cir.
Mar. 2, 2015), decision available here.
Players: Per curiam decision joined by Judges Wallace, M.
Smith, and Friedland.
Facts: Mendez-Soza plead guilty to illegal reentry, in
violation of 8 USC § 1326(a). Id. at
*1. He had been previously convicted of Criminal Sexual Contact under New
Jersey law. Id. At sentencing, the
district court concluded that the offense was a “crime of violence” under USSG
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(ii) and hit the defendant with the sixteen-level enhancement. Id.
Issue(s): “On appeal, Mendez-Sosa argues the 16-level
enhancement was improper for two reasons. First, he argues that he was never ‘convicted’
of the prior offense as that term is defined by either New Jersey law or the
Immigration and Nationality Act. Second, he argues that even if he had been
convicted of the prior offense, it was not a ‘crime of violence.’” Id. at *1.
Held: “We
affirm.” Id.
Of Note: To paraphrase Churchill, this brief opinion is a
riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an enigma. The core holding is this: “the
applicable definition of ‘conviction,’ for purposes of the sentencing
guidelines in the immigration context, is to be found in federal law, not state
law.” Id. For support for that new
proposition the panel
relies on an old First Circuit case, United
States v. Cuevas, 75 F.3d 778, 781 (1st Cir. 1996). Id.
What, exactly, was the alleged
problem with the New Jersey prior that gave rise to this issue? It is not explained
or described in the opinion. There are assurances that the defendant was “convicted”
and we’re told he “pled guilty” – but there is no factual explanation on why
this state definition of a “conviction” was in play. Was a nolo plea? Was it expunged? Diverted? Some exotic breed of East
Coast wobbler? Not clear – and ambiguity may mean opportunity.
How to Use:
Note the explicit
limitation of the Mendez-Sosa
holding: “for the purposes of the
sentencing guidelines in the immigration context.” Id. at *1 (emphasis added). The case doesn’t purport to extend the “federal
law” holding to the definition of “conviction” in other sentencing contexts
(think guns, drugs, Career Offender, etc.) If outside of this very limited immigration
/ sentencing context, make sure to cabin this opinion to its narrow holding.
And if you’re forced to fight Mendez-Sosa
in the immigration context, explore the real factual ambiguity underlying this new
Ninth holding.
For Further
Reading: Go to http://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/opinions/,
filter by Case Type “Criminal,” and behold the desert. Grizzled vets that
follow such things can’t remember any similar absence of criminal opinions
in the Ninth. There are traditional stretches of few opinions as the clerks
switch up in the fall, and we always see slow periods around the holidays, but this
winter’s opinion drought rivals California’s dry spell. The trend is of more
than passing interest: D.C. bean counters who write the checks keep a close eye
on these figures. See, e.g., US Courts stats here.
What gives? This may the downstream
impact of sequestration and the general decline in criminal filings. It may be
the pernicious impact of the growing use of appellate waivers in plea
agreements (and yet another argument for the abolition of such waivers). It may
be because the guidelines are increasingly irrelevant, and sentencing appeals
have thus dried up. Maybe there is a boom in mem dispos? Maybe it is all of
those things, together. Worrisome, though, when the nation’s largest federal Court of
Appeals seems to have lost its voice on criminal justice issues.
Nietzshe image and quote from http://izquotes.com/quote/135858
Steven Kalar,
Federal Public Defender ND Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
.
Labels: Guidelines, Section 1326, Sentencing, Taylor Analysis, USSG 2L1.2
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