Carrillo-Carrillo v. Coursey,
No. 14-35897 (5-24-16)(Watford with Fisher and Berzon). The 9th reversed the
dismissal of the IAC petition as being procedurally barred. It wasn't.
The petitioner had presented his claims, in a pro se portion of Balfour
brief (Oregon's version of Anders),
by attaching his PCR petition and incorporating it by reference. The petitioner may not have numbered the
claims exactly as required, but some leeway is granted, and the Oregon Supreme
Court has held such attachment can constitute presentation of the claim.
Here, the petitioner alleged IAC. He claimed he was pressured into taking a plea to 15 years when new charges had been filed, trial was looming, and he received bad advice from counsel, who conducted no investigation. The petitioner had presented the PCR in state court, lost after an evidentiary hearing, and then had a Balfour brief on appeal.
The 9th reverses the dismissal for procedural default and remands for the district court to review on the merits.
Congrats to AFPD Tony Bernstein, Oregon FPD (Portland).
Here, the petitioner alleged IAC. He claimed he was pressured into taking a plea to 15 years when new charges had been filed, trial was looming, and he received bad advice from counsel, who conducted no investigation. The petitioner had presented the PCR in state court, lost after an evidentiary hearing, and then had a Balfour brief on appeal.
The 9th reverses the dismissal for procedural default and remands for the district court to review on the merits.
Congrats to AFPD Tony Bernstein, Oregon FPD (Portland).
The decision is here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/05/24/14-35897.pdf
Rodriguez v. Copenhaver, No. 14-16399
(5-25-16)(Silverman with Graber; partial dissent by Tashima). The BOP denied nunc pro tunc discretionary
crediting a state sentence to a federal sentence pursuant to 18 USC 3621(b). In denying the credit, the BOP relied upon a
letter from a judge who was not the sentencing judge, as designated by statute,
and had been RECUSED. The judges for the
district had been recused because one of the judges had been the victim of one
of the offenses. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
The 9th held that the
courts had jurisdiction over the discretionary awarding of credit because the
petitioner alleged violation of statutory authority and a violation of
constitutional due process.
The 9th further held
that the BOP had indeed violated the statute by considering the letter, and had
violated due process. The 9th granted
the petition and ordered the BOP to consider the request without the letter.
Tashima partially
dissented. He would have found that the
BOP had committed error in relying on the letter. He would not have gone further and found a
due process violation.
Congrats to Steve
Sady and Elizabeth Daily of the FPD Oregon (Portland) office.
The decision is here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2016/05/25/14-16399.pdf
Smith v. Ryan, No. 14-99008 (5-26-16)(Paez with
Clifton and Owens)(Note: This is an Az FPD-CHU case). The 9th affirmed the
denial of petitioner's habeas challenge to his death sentences. In affirming, under AEDPA deference, the 9th
holds that confrontation did not apply in the sentencing phase, that sentencing
counsel was not ineffective and that Martinez
did not apply, that introduction of other crimes did not violate due process,
and that aggravator challenges for vagueness fail. The 9th found it reasonable for the state
supreme court to rely on a 1970 sentencing statute for aggravators and that it
could judicially narrow and define the terms.
In so doing, petitioner's categorical challenge was rejected.
Petitioner was
convicted in 1977 for two murders and given death. He has had several appeals, resentencings,
and petitioners. Petitioner has been on
death row for almost 40 years.
AFPD Mike Burke of
the AZ FPD - CHU (Phoenix) and AFPD
Kelly Culshaw (now of the Calif E - CHU) fought long and hard on this
case.
The decision is here:
Williams
v. Johnson, No. 07-56127 (5-27-16)(Kozinski with Whyte, Sr
D.J.; Reinhardt dissenting). This concerns whether, in habeas, a juror in a
state murder case was dismissed for bias or because she was a principled
holdout for acquittal. On remand from
the Supremes, in light of Williams,
the 9th considers whether, under AEDPA deference, the dismissal was
reasonable. The 9th holds it was; the
dissent argues it wasn't.
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