Case o' The Week: Seventeen will get you Twenty - Camez and juvenile offenses as substantive federal crimes
Age at time of offense: seventeen.
Troubling math from the
Ninth.
United
States v. Camez, 2016 WL 6068195 (9th Cir. Oct. 17, 2016), decision
available here.
Players:
Decision by Judge Graber, joined by Judge McKeown and District Judge Peterson.
Facts: Camez went to trial on RICO counterfeit card and ID charges.
Id. at *1. The jury was instructed
that it could not convict Camez solely
on conduct that took place before his eighteenth birthday. Id. Over defense objection, however, the jury was instructed that
it could “consider Defendant’s pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive
crimes.” Id.
Recall that substantive RICO counts
require a pattern of racketeering activity -- specifically, conviction on at least two predicate acts. Id.at *2 (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c)).
In a special verdict form, the jury convicted Camez of one predicate for
conduct before he was 18, a second allegation
for conduct after he was 18, and acquitted him on a third post-18 allegation. Id.
Issue(s): “Defendant argues that the Juvenile Delinquency Act (‘JDA’)
prohibits consideration of his pre-majority conduct as proof of the substantive
crimes.” Id.
“[F]or continuing crimes alleged to have occurred before and after the defendant turned 18, the statute provides no clear answer to the question whether the JDA applies. We face that situation here, because Defendant was 20 at the time of the indictment and because the government alleged that he committed the crime when he was both 17 and 18.” Id. at *2.
“[Defendant] argues . . . . that the JDA implicitly forbids a jury from considering any of his pre-majority conduct as substantive proof of the crime.” Id. at *3.
“[F]or continuing crimes alleged to have occurred before and after the defendant turned 18, the statute provides no clear answer to the question whether the JDA applies. We face that situation here, because Defendant was 20 at the time of the indictment and because the government alleged that he committed the crime when he was both 17 and 18.” Id. at *2.
“[Defendant] argues . . . . that the JDA implicitly forbids a jury from considering any of his pre-majority conduct as substantive proof of the crime.” Id. at *3.
Held: “[W]e hold that
the district court’s instruction, which comported with the law of most circuits
that have addressed this issue, was not erroneous. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment.” Id. at *1.
Of Note: In this case of first impression, the Ninth parts
ways with the D.C. Circuit. Id. at
*3. Unfortunately, DC had it right: that circuit has held that a “conviction
that rests in whole or in part on acts committed as a juvenile is invalid.” Id. at *3 (internal quotations and
citation omitted).
Camez bucks the national policy
trend. Neuroscience is confirming what all parents know: juvenile brains are
hired-wired differently. In 2012 the Supreme Court’s decision in Miller v. Alabama considered this science and kick-started
the trend of more progressive juvenile sentencing laws. See article here.
The Sentencing Commission has also signaled that is aware of this new science
– a current priority is the “Study of the treatment of youthful offenders under
the Guidelines Manual.” See List
of Commission Priorities here.
There’s a growing circuit split
on whether the JDA permits conviction on pre-majority conduct. Hopefully a full
Supreme Court will soon revisit the issue of juvenile justice, and continue its
Miller line.
How to Use:
Juvi conduct can now support federal convictions in the Ninth. Are there limits?
The First Circuit says, “yes:” a jury has to
find that continuing conduct went past the defendant’s 18th birthday. Id. at *4.
The Eleventh requires the government to
introduce sufficient evidence that the defendant’s crimes spanned 18. Id.
The Second just requires a court to look at
the defendant’s age at the time of the offense charged in the indictment –
there’s no additional evidentiary burden. Id.
at *5.
What approach did the Ninth adopt? “We need
not – and do not – determine which of those approaches is correct.” Id.
Though Judge Graber throws some dicta love towards
the Second Circuit approach, how the
court approaches juvenile convictions remains a very live issue in the Ninth.
Short answer: fight for the First Circuit's approach in Welch – that circuit’s
law “is the most restrictive of the various approaches.” Id. at *4.
For Further
Reading: Under federal law, juvi brain science impacts punishment. It also bears upon the Miranda “reasonableness” analysis.
Why aren’t substantive offenses
viewed with the same modern scientific lens? So asks Professor Jenny Carroll,
in her compelling article: Brain Science
and the Theory of Juvenile Mens Rea, 94 N. Carolina L. Rev. 539 (2016), available
here.
Image
of child in handcuffs from http://www.criminalattorneyinaustin.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/juvenile.jpg
Image of brain development from http://clbb.mgh.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/adolescentbraindev2-731x217.jpg
Steven Kalar,
Federal Public Defender, N.D. Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
.
Labels: Graber, Juvenile Delinquency Act, RICO
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