Case o' The Week: Conviction, Old, yet Ninth Upholds - Hohag and Conditions of Supervised Release, SORNA

The Hon. Judge Susan P. Graber

Not too old, if SORNA, we’re told.

United States v. Hohag, 2018 WL 3149773(9th Cir. June 28, 2018), decision available here.

Players: Decision by Judge Graber, joined by Judge M. Smith and DJ Hellerstein. 

  Hard-fought appeal by AFPD Francesca Freccero, D. Or. FPD.

Facts: Hohag was convicted of rape of a minor in 1992. Id. at *1. As part of that sentence, he was required to register as a sex offender. Id. 

  He moved to several states without registering, was arrested in Oregon in 2016, charged federally and convicted of failure to register as a sex offender. Id. 

  At sentencing, Hohag explained he had undergone sex offender treatment while incarcerated, and provided a polygraph confirming he was truthful in denying he’d had sexual contact with a minor since his release from supervision in ’02. Id. He was sentenced to time served. 

  The court imposed conditions of supervised release that included participating in a “sex-offense specific assessment” and submitting to polygraph testing “in conjunction with the . . . assessment.” Id.

Issue(s): “Defendant timely appeals, challenging only the two conditions of supervised release that relate to his history of sexual misconduct.” Id. at *2.

Held: “Together, T.M. and Johnson illustrate that, when we consider a condition of supervised release meant to address a defendant’s history of sexual misconduct, we look to at least two factors. First, as in every case, we consider the burdensomeness of the condition at issue. An assessment is significantly less burdensome than required treatment. Second, we ask whether the condition is reasonably necessary to accomplish one of the legitimate goals of supervised release. In answering that question in this context, we approach with some skepticism a condition that rests solely on an old sex offense. But when some recent event suggests that a defendant still poses a risk of engaging in sexual misconduct, there exists a greater need for a condition meant to address a defendant’s history of sexual misconduct.” Id. at *3.

  “Because the conditions at issue are not particularly burdensome and because they relate to Defendant’s crime of conviction, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion.” Id. at *5.

Of Note: In United States v. T.M., 330 F.3d 1235, 1239–40 (9th Cir. 2003), the Ninth reversed sex-offender treatment conditions imposed on the back of an old sex-offense prior.

  In United States v. Johnson, 697 F.3d 1249, 1251 (9th Cir. 2012), the Ninth upheld a sex-offender assessment condition despite equally old priors.

  In the present case, Hohag, Judge Graber concedes (in a considerable understatement) that these cases arrive at “seemingly conflicting conclusions.” Id. at *3. The analysis in Hohag struggles to explain the distinctions, and concludes that the conditions here – an assessment – based on a “related” sex offense (a SORNA crime), support the conditions. Id. at *4-*5. It is a troubling outcome, assuring us that a sexual-assessment is a “minimal burden on [Hohag’s] liberty,” and that polygraph testing is a “relatively uninstrusive means of evaluating a defendant’s risk of engaging in sexual misconduct.” Id. at *3.

  Like it or no, Hohag joins T.M. and Johnson in the Ninth’s – complicated – guidance on supervised release conditions for sex offenders.

How to Use: A (small) hook in Hohag is the fact that the condition imposed was just an assessment – it was not the more intrusive sex-offender treatment. Id. at *4. Judge Graber relies on that heavily on that distinction while upholding the condition. Id.

  Push back when Probation wants a condition of treatment on an old offense: that falls closer to the prohibited conditions in T.M., in the spectrum laid out by Judge Graber in Hohag.  

                                               

For Further Reading: The defense argued that the Sentencing Commission did not recommend sex offender assessments as a condition of supervised release for SORNA convictions (like the one underlying Hohag). Id. at *4. “Meh,” sniffed the Ninth – Guideline conditions are “only advisory.” Id.

   Like the Ninth, the Second Circuit also seems increasingly indifferent to the Commissions’ wisdom. For an interesting piece on that trend, see Substantive Reasonableness Review Finally Getting Teeth in the Second Circuit, available here.

Image of the Honorable Judge Susan P. Graber from https://twitter.com/scotusambitions/status/570100615684227072

Steven Kalar, Federal Public Defender, Northern District of California. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org

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