1. US v. Briones, No. 16-10150 (7-9-19)(en
banc)(Christen for majority; Bennett (joined by Ikuta) dissenting). Note: Az
FPD was involved.
Dissenting, Bennett focus extensively on the juvenile’s criminal history and acts, and would find that the district court resentencing, in less than two pages of transcript, to LWOP was constitutionally sufficient and supported by the record, in less than two pages of a transcript.
2. US v. Evans, No. 17-30185
(7-9-19)(O’Scannlain w/Bea & Friedland). Two defendants tried to get into
the medical marijuana growing business. Entrepreneurs, they embarked on a
growing and harvesting marijuana. Alas, they ran afoul of federal and state
authorities, and were charged with federal offenses. They sought interlocutory
relief, which the 9th heard, arguing that 538 prevented DOJ prosecution if they
followed state law. The 9th remanded, ordering a hearing to see if they had
strictly complied with the Washington state medical marijuana statute.
After a remand, and a denial of their affirmative defense under 538, they
appealed, arguing again that DOJ could not prosecute them because they were
following state law. The 9th concluded that the defendant’s were not in “strict
compliance” with state law as they were not state designated providers, and
they smoked pot (!) while growing and harvesting marijuana and were not
qualifying patients. The 9th held too that in seeking to enjoin prosecution
under 538, the burden was on the defendants to show compliance. Further, they
were not entitled to a jury verdict of noncompliance.
This
is an important Miller juvenile LWOP)
decision. Sitting en banc, the 9th reversed the district court’s re-imposition
of a LWOP juvenile sentence in a resentencing, holding the district court’s
analysis was “inconsistent with the constitutional principles the Supreme Court
delineated in Miller and subsequent case law[.]” (6). In so doing, the 9th set
forth the test and factors to be followed, emphasizing that a life sentence for
a juvenile is rare even extraordinary. It is for a small class of juvenile
offenders who are truly corrupt, incorrigible, and irredeemable. They are
beyond all hope. “LWOP sentences are ‘disproportionate for all but the
rarest’ juvenile offenders...”even when they commit terrible crimes.” A
resentencing must reorientate the analysis for a sentence forward and the
possibility of change rather than just backward looking at criminal history.
“The key question is whether the defendant is capable of change.” (19).
Here,
the district court tried to step into the shoes of the prior judge at that time
of sentencing. The district court did not explain sufficiently its sentence nor
apply factors set forth in Miller, Montgomery, and Pete. The defendant offered abundant evidence that he was not
irreparably corrupt nor irredeemable. He had made tremendous strides in
rehabilitation. The government moreover had offered a plea, at the time of the
original offense in 1997, to a twenty-year sentence. The defendant was 17 years
old at that time, and under the influence of his father, also a defendant,
rejected the plea.
Dissenting, Bennett focus extensively on the juvenile’s criminal history and acts, and would find that the district court resentencing, in less than two pages of transcript, to LWOP was constitutionally sufficient and supported by the record, in less than two pages of a transcript.
Congrats
to CJA counsel Vikki Lyles and Easha Anand of Orrick Herrington. Special note
should be made of the numerous amicus briefs on the defendant’s behalf,
including AACJ, NACDL, many state NACDL affiliates, nonprofit advocacy groups,
and law professors. Kudos to AFPD Keith Hilzendeger, FPD Az, who authored the
amicus brief for the Federal Defenders of the 9th Cir.
The
decision is here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/07/09/16-10150.pdf
The decision is here:
http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2019/07/09/17-30185.pdf
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