Case o' The Week: Ninth Very Intentional, on Recklessness - Begay, Recklessness, and Crimes of Violence
No “crazy
pills” were ingested in the writing of this opinion.
The Hon. Judge D.W. Nelson |
Players:
Decision by Judge D.W. Nelson, joined by Judge Clifton. Dissent by Judge N.R.
Smith.
Admirable victory for AFPD “Edie” Cunningham, D. Arizona.
Facts: Begay
was convicted of second-degree murder, in violation of 18 USC §§ 1111 and 1153.
Id. at *1.
He was also convicted of discharging a gun during a “crime of violence”
(this murder), under 18 USC § 924(c). Id. at *2.
Issue(s): “Begay
was convicted of discharging a firearm during a ‘crime of violence’ under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c). On appeal, Begay argues that second-degree murder does not
qualify as a ‘crime of violence.’” Id.
Held: “To
determine whether second-degree murder is a ‘crime of violence’ we apply the ‘categorical
approach’ laid out in Taylor . . . Based on the facts of this case, it
may be hard to understand how the shooting of [the victim,] Ben by Begay might
not be a ‘crime of violence.’ Under the categorical approach, however, we do
not look to the facts underlying the conviction, but “compare the elements of
the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction with the elements
of” a “crime of violence.” See Descamps. . . . The defendant’s crime
cannot be a categorical ‘crime of violence’ if the conduct proscribed by the
statute of conviction is broader than the conduct encompassed by the statutory
definition of a “crime of violence.” See id.” Id. at *3.
“Second-degree murder does not constitute
a crime of violence under the elements clause—18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) (A)—because
it can be committed recklessly.” Id.
at *4. “We REVERSE Count Two of Begay’s conviction for discharging a firearm
during a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) . . . .” Id.
at *6.
Of Note: Judge N.R. Smith begins
his dissent by quoting Zoolander: “I feel like I am taking crazy pills.”
Id. at *6 (N.R. Smith, J., dissenting).
In Judge Smith’s view, the
majority should have used second-degree murder’s “malice aforethought” requirement
as some sort of proxy, that revs-up a reckless-conduct offense into qualifying
as a “crime of violence.” He urges this novel “malice aforethought” theory as a
new way to find that a reckless second-degree murder is serious enough to
be a “crime of violence.” Id.
Judge Smith’s dissent conspicuously
baits the en banc hook. The Ninth shouldn't bite – the dissent doesn’t
grapple with the reality of the controlling Ninth Circuit, en banc Fernandez-Ruiz
decision, and fails to engage with the Majority’s (correct) reading of Voisine.
While this outcome may stick in some craws, Begay’s legal analysis is
spot on.
How to Use:
The nub of Begay is this: did the Supreme
Court’s 2016 decision in Voisine, holding that a “misdemeanor crime of
domestic violence” includes “reckless assaults,” overrule the Ninth’s 2006, en banc Fernandez-Ruiz decision, holding that crimes that can be committed
recklessly are not “crimes of violence” under § 16? Id. at *5.
In a
thoughtful and principled analysis, Judge D.W. Nelson carefully explains that Voisine
left this question open. Id. Judge Nelson remains faithful to Ninth
Circuit law interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 16 to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and – staying
true to precedent – continues to hold that a “crime of violence under 18
U.S.C. § 924(c)(3) requires the intentional use of force.” Id.
Read Begay carefully when considering
a “reckless” offense the government argues is a “crime of violence.” Under
existing Ninth authority, “reckless” just won’t cut it.
For Further
Reading: Last week a (Latino) Tenderloin drug
dealer was sentenced in federal court, in the Northern District of California. See N.D. Cal. USAO Press Release here.
A week or so before, the “Federal Initiative for the Tenderloin” (“FIT”) kicked off, with drug charges filed against nine (Latino) defendants in the Tenderloin. See N.D. Cal. USAO Press Release
here.
Days before that, thirteen (Latino) defendants were charged in a drug trafficking
conspiracy, for allegedly selling drugs in the Tenderloin. See N.D. Cal. USAO Press Release here.
Substitute “Latino defendant” for “black
defendant,” and the USAO's new “FIT"-focus has some Safe Schools déjà vu,
all over again. See “For Further Reading,” available here; and here.
Image
of the Honorable Judge D.W. Nelson from https://ms-jd.org/blog/article/first-women-dorothy-w-nelson
Image
of Zoolander from https://www.looper.com/127320/what-the-cast-of-zoolander-looks-like-today/
.
Image
of “Tenderloin National Forest” from https://www.latinousa.org/2012/05/11/tenderloin-national-forest/
Steven Kalar, Federal
Public Defender ND Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
.
Labels: Categorical analysis, Crime of Violence, Reckless Conduct and Crime of Violence, Taylor Analysis
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