US
v. Henderson, No. 19-30209 (6-3-21)(Callahan
w/Christen; Rakoff dissenting). See below regarding this SR and Apprendi case
(Keith Hilzendeger acts occasionally as a “guest” commentator).
Adhering to circuit precedent, the Ninth Circuit held
today that there is no right under Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), to a jury trial upon revocation of
supervised release where the revocation sentence would make the total term of
imprisonment for the crime (including the initial term) exceed the statutory
maximum. A divided panel said that United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct.
2369 (2019), did not implicitly overrule circuit precedent that foreclosed the
argument.
Judge Rakoff, sitting by designation from the Southern District of New York, dissented. Vigorously. His dissent is worth a read. He questions the majority’s deployment of stare decisis rules and would rule in the defendant’s favor on the merits of the 6A challenge.
To quote from the opinion:
Patrick Lawrence Henderson appeals his fifteen-month
sentence for violating the terms of his supervised release, arguing that it
violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights because it extends his
incarceration beyond the maximum term of imprisonment for his underlying
conviction, without findings of fact proved to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt. See Apprendi v. New Jersey,
530 U.S. 466 (2000). However, Henderson’s argument is based on the plurality
opinion in United States v. Haymond,
139 S.Ct. 2369 (2019), and Justice Breyer’s controlling concurring opinion did
not adopt the plurality’s position. Thus, Haymond
did not overrule or undermine our prior opinion in United States v. Purvis, 940 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1991), which held
a term of supervised release may extend beyond the statutory maximum for the
underlying substantive offense. Nor does Haymond
hold that the right to jury findings proved beyond a reasonable doubt
recognized in Apprendi extends to a
revocation of supervised release hearing. Indeed, as the dissent concedes, when
district courts revoke supervised release, the new sentences they impose are
treated, for constitutional purposes, “as part of the penalty for the initial
offense,” Johnson v. United States,
529 U.S. 694, 700 (2000). Neither our circuit nor any of our sister circuits
has adopted or endorsed Henderson’s argument that the terms of imprisonment and
the terms of reimprisonment must be aggregated and may not exceed the maximum
term of the statute of conviction. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s
sentence.
The decision is here:
https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2021/06/03/19-30209.pdf
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