1. US v. Harris, No. 16-10152 (4-20-17)(per curiam w/Tallman, Watford, & Guirola).  Defendant's interest in a trust qualifies as property under the federal debt collection procedure (garnishment). The government is not seeking to compel distributions from the trust to satisfy a 1997 debt arising from convictions. The government's writ of garnishment continues until the debt is satisfied.

The decision is here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/04/20/16-10152.pdf

 

2.  US v. Rivera-Muniz, No. 15-10560 (4-20-17)(Kobayashi w/Bybee & N. Smith). This is a categorical challenge to voluntary manslaughter as a Crime of Violence under 2L1.2 for a 1326 conviction. Defendant argues that the "recklessness" prong of the California penal statue. The 9th held that voluntary manslaughter was a CoV because it was an enumerated offense in the guidelines and the state statute fell within the common law and commonly understood elements of the offense.

The decision is here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/04/20/15-10560.pdf

3.  US v. Fryberg, No. 16-30013 (4-21-17) (Graber w/Ikuta & Hurwitz). This is a confrontation issue.  The defendant was charged and convicted as a prohibited possessor of a firearm.  On appeal, he argues error in the court admitting into evidence return of service of a notice of a domestic violence protection order hearing.  The hearing was held before a tribal court and the defendant did not appear for the hearing.  A protective order was then issued.  Subsequently, the defendant acquired several firearms. The government then charged him as a prohibited possessor.   At trial, the government relied on the return of service to prove the defendant knew there was a hearing set. The officer who had served the notice was deceased. 

The 9th holds that the admission of the return of service did not violate hearsay or confrontation clause.  The return of service was admissible under the public records exception to hearsay under Fed R Evid 803(8)(A)(ii).  The service of a notice is ministerial. The notice was basically an observation, and non-adversarial.  The court did not abuse its discretion in its admission or in allowing it in as trustworthy.

As for the confrontation objection, the return of service was not testimonial.  While the return of service smacked of a prosecutorial function, and not civil like many immigration matters, it was not though a new record for this prosecution. It was an administrative filing contemporaneous to a ministerial function.

The decision is here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/04/21/16-30013.pdf

4.  US v. Johnson, No. 15-30350 (4-21-17)(Callahan w/Paez & England). The 9th reversed and remanded to allow the court to impose more restitution.  The defendant was convicted of wire fraud.  The victims of that fraud were given restitution but not the victims of other conduct.  The court concluded that it could only award restitution for the count of conviction.  The 9th held that this was error.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3663A (MVRA), restitution could be ordered for victims harmed by the defendant's scheme, including beyond the count of conviction.  The remand is to determine if the defendant's activities beyond the conviction were sufficiently related to the conviction to be included for restitution purposes for the other victims.

The decision is here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/04/21/15-30350.pdf

5.  Weeden v. Johnson, No. 14-17366 (4-21-17)(Hurwitz w/Molloy; Callahan dissenting). The 9th found IAC in this juvenile habeas.  The petitioner was 14 when she allegedly organized a bungled robbery in which a victim was shot and died.  She was not present.  The defense lawyer mounted a character defense; he did not have testing done because it would interfere with his trial strategy.  Subsequent testing, post-conviction, revealed severe cognitive deficiencies.  The 9th reversed for IAC, stating that counsel's investigation must determine trial strategy and not the other way around.  Such failure to investigate violated Strickland.  Callahan dissented, arguing that deference must be paid to trial counsel and state courts.  She fears this per se rule regarding experts will shake many sound state convictions.

The decision is here:

http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2017/04/21/14-17366.pdf