Case o' The Week: Once More Into the Breach - Plascencia-Orozco and Breach of Plea Agreements
Honorable Judge Carlos Bea |
Practice pointer: When an
opinion starts by observing that a defendant stands out as a “cara dura,” things
probably won’t end well.
United States v. Plascencia-Orozco, 2017 U.S.
App. LEXIS 5445 (9th Cir. Mar. 29, 2017), opinion available here.
Players:
Decision by Judge Bea, joined by Judges Callahan and Ikuta.
Facts: Plascencia-Orozo
stole the I.D. of U.S. citizen “Del Muro.” He attempted unlawful entry using the
Del Muro identity in 2008 and 2011. Id.
at *4.
In 2008, Plascencia plead guilty to importation of marijuana: remaining
counts were dismissed pursuant to a plea agreement. Id. The plea agreement allowed the dismissed agg ID and reentry
charges to be resuscitated in the event of a breach, or if Plascencia
unlawfully returned to the U.S. during his term of supervised release. Id. at *11.
Plascencia was removed after serving his term.
Two months later, in 2011, he was caught attempting to reenter again,
with the “Del Muro” identity.
Plascencia was charged with agg ID theft and attempted illegal reentry. Id. One set of the agg ID / reentry
charges came from the (dismissed) 2008 counts, on a theory Plascencia had
breached his ‘08 plea agreement. Id.
at *5-*6.
In a pretrial hearing, the district court found a breach of the plea
agreement by a preponderance of the evidence. Plascencia was convicted after
trial. Id. at *3, *6.
Issue(s): “Plascencia argues that the district court erred by
ruling that Plascencia had breached his 2008 plea agreement at a pretrial
motions-in-limine hearing. Instead, Plascencia argues, the district court
should have submitted the issue to the jury. Alternatively, Plascencia
contends, it should have at least required the government to seek a finding of
breach before reindicting Plascencia on the 2008 charges.” Id. at *16.
Held: “We have never
squarely held that a district judge may find that a defendant breached a prior
plea agreement at a pretrial hearing, without submitting the question to a
jury.” Id. at *18 (footnote omitted).
“We join the First Circuit in holding that the question of breach is for the
district judge, not a jury, to decide.” Id.
at *19.
“We have also never
expressly addressed whether the government must seek a judicial finding of
breach before indicting a defendant on charges barred by a plea agreement. [W]e
think that . . . —a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b), with an evidentiary
hearing to resolve disputed factual issues and a burden of proof that rests
squarely on the government—are sufficient to protect a defendant’s due-process
right to enforce the terms of his plea agreement. Plascencia has pointed us to
no statute or case law requiring the government to seek a preindictment finding
of breach, and we decline to recognize such a requirement here.” Id. at *21 (footnote omitted).
“In sum, we conclude
that the proper way for a defendant to raise a prior plea agreement as a
defense to a criminal charge is to move to dismiss that charge under Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b). If the government thinks that the defendant
has breached the plea agreement, such that it no longer applies, then it must proffer
sufficient evidence to establish that breach by a preponderance of the
evidence. . . . The matter need not be submitted to a jury, nor need it be
decided before the indictment or information is filed. The district court
followed these procedures here, and its ruling at the motions-in-limine hearing
that Plascencia had breached his plea agreement was not reversible error.”
Id. at *23.
Of Note: The defense of this case was – challenging. Plascencia
initiated bar complaints against two attorneys, ended up with three attorneys,
and was denied a fourth. He made “an obscene gesture” at a juror, and testified
that he was the father of Del Muro’s children (contradicting the testimony of
the mother of Del Muro’s children).
The only (somewhat) bright spot is the Ninth’s reversal of a “free standing”
order that Plascencia to use his true name in the future. Id. at *37-*38.
How to Use:
Judge Bea notes (and avoids) conflicted standards of review in the breach
context. Id. at *14 n. 8. Despite
that sidestep, Plascencia creates new
law for breach in the Ninth, and lays out the analysis of breach under the existing
rules. It is now a lead Ninth opinion on how to tackle breached plea
agreements.
For Further
Reading: Can you exploit a D.J.’s wink, and deliberately breach a plea agreement when a better sentence than the deal is the likely outcome?
For a good article on this ethical bind, see Can Defense Counsel Ethically Breach a Plea
Agreement?, available here.
Image
of the Honorable Carlos Bea from http://abovethelaw.com/2006/11/atl-party-crash-the-final-fed-soc-photos/
Steven Kalar,
Federal Public Defender N.D. Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
.
Labels: Bea, Breach, Plea Agreements, Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
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