Case o' The Week: Venn and the Art of Jurisprudential Maintenance - Davis and Fractured Supreme Court decisions
The Ninth gets all Venn on us.
United States v. Davis, 2016 WL
3245043 (9th Cir. June 13, 2016) (en banc), decision available here.
Players: Decision by Judge Paez, joined by Judges Fletcher, Rawlinson,
Callahan, and Owens.
Concurring opinion by Judge Christen, joined by CJ Thomas, and Judges Tallman, Nguyen, and Hurwitz.
Judge Bea, dissenting.
Big win argued by ND Cal (and Jones Day) counsel Nathaniel Garrett.
Concurring opinion by Judge Christen, joined by CJ Thomas, and Judges Tallman, Nguyen, and Hurwitz.
Judge Bea, dissenting.
Big win argued by ND Cal (and Jones Day) counsel Nathaniel Garrett.
Facts: Davis plead guilty to distributing crack, under a
(c)(1)(C) deal. Id. at *2. The
agreement acknowledged a guideline range and recommended a sentence below it. Id. Congress then passed the Fair
Sentencing Act, and Commission adopted lower retroactive crack guidelines. Id. at *3. Davis filed a § 3582 motion
to reduce his sentence. The district court held it was bound by Justice
Sotomayor’s concurring opinion in Freeman,
and found it lacked jurisdiction because Davis’s sentence was “based on” the
(C) deal, not the guidelines. Id. at
*4. A three-judge panel affirmed, and the case went en banc.
Issue(s): “[W]e must consider how to interpret the Supreme
Court's fractured opinion in Freeman . .
., which addressed whether a defendant sentenced pursuant to a Federal Rule
of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement is eligible for a sentence reduction
under . . . § 3582(c)(2) . . .” Id.
at *2 (citation omitted].
Held: “Revisiting Freeman
and our application of Marks to fractured Supreme Court opinions, we
hold that where we can identify no rationale common to a majority of the Justices,
we are bound only by the result. In so holding, we join the D.C. Circuit, which
concluded that Freeman lacks a controlling opinion ‘because the plurality
and concurring opinions do not share common reasoning whereby one analysis is a
logical subset of the other.’ . . . Bound only by Freeman’s specific result,
the D.C. Circuit adopted the plurality opinion’s approach, which holds that “[e]ven
when a defendant enters into an 11(c)(1)(C) agreement, the judge’s decision to
accept the plea and impose the recommended sentence is likely to be based on the
Guidelines; and when it is, the defendant should be eligible to seek § 3582(c)(2)
relief.” . . . . We also adopt this approach and overrule Austin. Applying
the plurality approach, we conclude that Davis is eligible to seek a sentence reduction
under § 3582(c)(2).” Id.
at *2 (citation omitted).
Of Note: Great result for drug resentencing – but the far bigger
issue decided in Davis is how the
Ninth deals with fractured Supreme Court decisions. Judge Paez provides a clear
explanation of the two main approaches: one focusing on the reasoning of the various opinions, and
the other focusing on the ultimate results.
Id. at *5.
Judge Paez concedes that the Ninth’s own decisions on the fractured-Supremes conundrum have “not been a model of clarity.” Id. “To foster clarity,” this en banc decision “explicitly adopt[s] the reasoning-based approach to applying Marks.” Id.
Judge Paez concedes that the Ninth’s own decisions on the fractured-Supremes conundrum have “not been a model of clarity.” Id. “To foster clarity,” this en banc decision “explicitly adopt[s] the reasoning-based approach to applying Marks.” Id.
The Ninth imagines a Venn diagram
with the plurality and concurring opinions: one can’t envision overlapping
circles with Justice Sotomayor’s and the plurality opinion. Id. at *7.
With this reasoning approach, the Ninth stands with D.C. and breaks with the approach
of four circuits. Id. at *8. (But
with our drifting 4-4 Supreme Court, query whether circuit splits are still as vulnerable
to cert. calls?)
How to Use:
“Even when a defendant enters into an 11(c) (1)(C) agreement, the judge’s
decision to accept the plea and impose the recommended sentence is likely to be
based on the Guidelines; and when it is, the defendant should be eligible to
seek § 3582(c)(2) relief.” Id. at 10.
Scratch out § 3582(c)(2), substitute “§ 2255”, and our Johnson habeas clients are off to the races. During this Summer of Johnson Replies, turn to Davis for our (C) clients (and other “plea agreement” arguments in the gov’t Oppositions). Like a virus, the Guidelines infect all sentences: a deal’s recommendation won’t immunize a case from Johnson attack.
Scratch out § 3582(c)(2), substitute “§ 2255”, and our Johnson habeas clients are off to the races. During this Summer of Johnson Replies, turn to Davis for our (C) clients (and other “plea agreement” arguments in the gov’t Oppositions). Like a virus, the Guidelines infect all sentences: a deal’s recommendation won’t immunize a case from Johnson attack.
For Further
Reading: Great timing, Davis: we may use it next week. Two big Supreme Court decisions are expected in
very short order: Mathis, summary here, and Voisine, summary here.
Both cases are important for four Johnson efforts: decisions will start hit at 7:00 a.m. Monday June
20th.
Image
of Venn diagram from http://jasminejonesy.tumblr.com/post/128324172173/11-funny-venn-diagrams-to-brighten-up-your-day
Steven
Kalar, Federal Public Defender, N.D. Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
.
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Labels: 11(c)(1)(C) Deals, Drug Resentencing, En Banc, Johnson, Paez, Plurality Decisions
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