Case o' The Week: Bank Bureaucrats and Baccarat -- Xu, RICO and Foreign Relevant Conduct

Chao Fan Xu

 Hard to imagine two victims with less of a sense of humor, to target for a fraud scam: the People’s Republic of China, and casinos.

  

  Chao Fan Xu hit ‘em both.

   United States v. Xu, 2013 WL 28392 (9th Cir. Jan. 3, 2013), decision available here.

Players: Decision by Judge Goodwin, joined by Judges Reinhardt and Murguia.

Facts: Xu, and three other Chinese nationals, “stole as much money as possible from the Bank of China; transferred the stolen funds out of the Bank of China; escaped, through immigration fraud, to a safe harbor in the United States; and then spent the funds in, among other places, Las Vegas casinos.” Id. at *3.

 (Almost half a billion dollars, in total loss). 

  The defendants gambled with a big chunk of the money, playing baccarat in Macao, Australia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Las Vegas. Id. at *2. There were basically two steps in the scheme: massive Chinese bank fraud, followed by the U.S. immigration fraud, money laundering, and conspiracies. After the Chinese government discovered the bank fraud, the defendants were arrested, tried, and convicted in the U.S. of RICO allegations, conspiracy, money laundering, and immigration fraud. Id. at *2-*3.

Issue(s): “Defendants argue that their count one convictions are invalid because the charged conspiracy was extraterritorial and outside the reach of RICO.” Id. at *3.

Held: “We affirm Defendant’s count one conviction because the convictions are not based on an improper extraterritorial application of RICO, but rather are based on a pattern of racketeering activities that were conducted by the Defendants in the territorial United States.” Id. at *8.

Of Note: In Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., the Supremes rejected extraterritorial application of the Securities Exchange Act. Id. at *3. After Morrison, it has been an unsettled question whether RICO applies to extraterritorial schemes. Id. 

In Xu, Judge Goodwin holds for the first time in the Ninth that RICO can apply to extraterritorial schemes, if there was a “pattern of racketeering activities” within the United States. Id. at *6-*7. Xu is an important and dangerous expansion of RICO’s scope. Anticipate much litigation on what “pattern of racketeering activities” means: seems a fact-bound inquiry, and it is still unclear how extensive a domestic “pattern” must exist to trigger RICO exposure.  

How to Use: Xu lost the RICO battle but won big in the sentencing war. In another important holding of first impression, Judge Goodwin holds that it is procedural error at sentencing to rely on relevant conduct from foreign crimes in the guideline analysis. Id. at *20-*21. With roughly $482 million in Chinese fraud in Xu, that holding should shave off an offense level or two on remand! Any limitation on the hated guideline relevant conduct rules is a defense win: remember Xu if faced with relevant conduct generated from foreign crimes. (Query whether we can expand Xu’s relevant conduct limitation in international drug and smuggling cases?).

                                               

For Further Reading: On Monday Jan. 7, the Supreme Court will hear argument on Decamps – an important case on the Taylor modified categorical analysis. In the en banc Aguila Montes de Oca (AMdO) opinion, the Ninth took a (largely unintelligible) stab at the Decamps issue: how to deal with a state prior conviction that is missing an element of a generic federal offense. The Supremes will consider AMdO in the guise of review of the unpublished Decamps mem dispo., and the outcome could have a huge impact on federal sentencing. 

 For a particularly thoughtful description of the Decamp contretemps (and musings on the much bigger Apprendi issues at stake), see "When is a burglary a 'burglary'? here.    

Baccarat image from http://www.baccaratstrategy.info/gfx/baccarat.jpg   Image of Chao Fan Xu from http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2008-09/02/content_6988048.htm

Steven Kalar, Senior Litigator N.D. Cal. FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org

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Case o' The Week: Ninth Affirms for Posts on Aptly-Named, "Raging Bull" - Securities Fraud, Jenkins

Does vague internet chatter on a bulletin board called "Raging Bull" rise to the level of a "material misrepresentation" supporting security fraud?

Yep (and particularly so when a company board member and stockholder relies on Raging Bull for info on the corporation). United States v. Jenkins, 2011 WL 208357 (9th Cir. 2011), decision available here.

Players: Decision by Judge B. Fletcher.

Facts: Jenkins was disbarred lawyer who created a Bahamian shell corporation to further a “pump and dump” scheme. Id. at *2. Jenkins and a co-defendant inflated the company’s value with (false) assurances on an internet bulletin board called, “Raging Bull.” Id. The duo then dumped the inflated stock through a Canadian brokerage. Id.

The case was investigated by Canada, and the US feds got an order tolling the statute of limitations while a MLAT request to Canada was pending. Id. at *4. The initial application for a tolling order did not have a supporting affidavit. Id.

Jenkins was convicted of various white collar counts after trial and received a sentence of ninety months (down from guidelines of 324-405!). Id. He appealed (including a challenge to the reasonableness of his sentence).

Issue(s): “The principal legal issue we face is whether 18 U.S.C. § 3292 suspended the running of the statute of limitations . . . . Section 3292 permits the district court to suspend the statute upon finding that the government reasonably believes evidence of a crime under investigation by a grand jury is in a foreign country and has requested that evidence.” Id. at *1. “[Jenkins] argues that an application to suspend the running of the statute of limitations must be supported by a sworn affidavit or other material of evidentiary value . . . .” Id.

Held: “[W]e hold that when the government moves to suspend the statute of limitations under § 3292, it must present something with evidentiary value tending to prove it is reasonably likely that evidence of the charged offenses is in the foreign country – not merely unsupported assertions.” Id. at *6 (internal quotations and citations omitted).

Of Note: This statute of limitations holding is a new rule for the Ninth, and follows a case out of the Eleventh Circuit. Id. at *6. Unfortunately for Jenkins, the government “cured” this mistake by submitting a supplemental application for order with an affidavit, that saved the otherwise-blown statute of limitations. Id. at *7.

How to Use: Jenkins is chock-a-block with white collar issues: two newish holdings merit flagging. First, Jenkins complains on appeal that a securities fraud conviction can’t rest on misrepresentations on an informal internet bulletin board (“Raging Bull”) – after all, what reasonable investor would ever rely on vague internet chatter? Surely an internet chat post isn’t “material?” Id. at *10. “We are not persuaded,” responds Judge Fletcher – there was sufficient evidence “to allow the jury to conclude that the Raging Bull posts were material.” Id. at *10. Hence, beware that “material” misrepresentations can lurk in even the most unreliable of places.

The second issue of note is a righteous challenge to some money-laundering counts, where the funds at issue went from Canada to Antigua without ever crossing US borders. Id. at *12. That challenge was rather summarily rejected by the Court, based on FRE 1006 “summary exhibits” illustrating the flow of funds from Canada to the United States. Id. at *13. Hence, beware of those brightly-colored flow-charts trotted out by government agents at trial: that innocuous “summary” evidence has a way of transforming itself into substantive evidence that can defeat an appeal.

For Further Reading: The roots of the fraud in Jenkins was a businessman who touted infrared camera technology for an application that wouldn’t work. Id. at *2. Last week a similar fraud was revealed by the BBC: millions of dollars worth of electronic “bomb detection devices” were sold internationally with the active endorsement of the British military. The gadgets (they look like divining rods) are pure hooey: their guts contain a digital anti-theft tag designed to prevent shoplifting. For a very interesting video and article on this scam, see here. The first arrest has already taken place: look forward to bomb dowsing-rod clients coming soon to a jurisdiction near you.


Image of the Wall Street bull from http://www.digitaljournal.com/img/8/7/3/i/4/1/8/o/RagingBull-WallStreet.jpg


Steven Kalar, Senior Litigator N.D. Cal FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org

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Case o' The Week: Graber and Waiver - Laurienti and 10b-5

In a new rule for white collar defense, Judge Graber (left) holds that brokers can be criminally liable for failure to disclose commissions - if they owe a fiduciary duty to their clients. United States v. Laurienti,__ F.3d __, 2010 WL 2266986 (9th Cir. June 16, 2010), decision available here.

Before you write-off Laurienti as irrelevant to indigent defense, note that a PD had part of this case, and that the decision is thick with holdings that apply outside of the white collar context.

Players: Decision by Judge Graber. Hard-fought case by, among others, SF appellate attorney Dennis Riordan, CD Cal AFPD Jonathan Libby, and Oakland appellate attorney Karen Landau.

Facts: Laurienti and his co-defendants were senior brokers in a firm charged with having a “pump and dump” scheme – pushing select “house” stocks on clients and getting secret “bonus” commissions for the sales. Id. at *1. They were charged with, among other things, securities fraud conspiracy under the conspiracy statute (§ 371) and securities violations (including 17 CFR § 240.10b-5).

A key legal theory was that the brokers failed to disclose these bonus commissions. Id. at *4-*5. Although the government asked for one, the trial court rejected an instruction requiring the jury to find the brokers owed their clients a fiduciary duty. Id. at *11. All were convicted at trial.

Issue(s): “[W]hether, and (if so) in what circumstances, a broker’s failure to disclose bonus commissions can give rise to criminal liability.” Id. at *5.

Held: “[W]hen a relationship of trust and confidence exists between a broker and client, a broker must disclose all facts material to that relationship.” Id. at *7 (emphasis added). . . [W]e reject Defendant’s argument that a broker never has a duty to disclose bonus commissions.” Id.

Of Note: This is a long, dense, and complex decision with many holdings important to indigent defense beyond the core 10b-5, white collar analysis. Here’s one of concern – the central holding of the case, on 10b-5 liability, is probably irrelevant because a defendant can conspire to commit securities fraud even if the underlying act isn’t a crime. Id. at *4-*5 (“In short, even if the failure to disclose was perfectly legal in all circumstances, the government still met its burden to establish a conspiracy.”) It is a troubling and expansive theory of criminal liability, reminiscent of a similar holding in the recent United States v. Judy Green decision. See blog here.

Another unwelcome holding is that the government can use “guilt-assuming hypotheticals” when asking questions of its own fact witnesses. Id. at *16. On a brighter note, the Court found the district court erred by limiting the testimony of a defense securities expert. Id. at *15 - *16 (though, sadly, it was harmless error).

How to Use: Because there was no instruction requiring the jury find a fiduciary relationship for these defendants, there was error in this trial. A big question for the Ninth was how to review this error – was it waived by the defense, given Laurienti’s opposition to the government’s proposed “fiduciary” instruction? Id. at *11-*12. Judge Graber concludes that the legal issue was waived by Laurienti and – of greater interest – found it was waived by other the defendants as well. Why? Because, in a familiar practice, the trial judge had held that an objection raised by one defendant would be deemed to have been raised by all. Id. at *12. Judge Graber explained that the co-defendants’ silence, in the context of Laurienti’s fight about the jury instructions, could constitute waiver of the legal argument. Id.

It is a worrisome holding for multiple defendant cases, and a reminder to keep a sharp eye out for legal arguments or objections raised by co-counsel that can be imputed against you on appeal (even if you remain silent).

For Further Reading: Quon? Gone. The Ninth Circuit, dragging the nation into the 21st century, gave us the great Quon decision on the Fourth Amendment search of a text pager. 529 F.3d 892 (9th Cir. 2008).

But, what the Ninth giveth, the Supremes taketh away. Ontario v. Quon, 2010 WL 2400087 (June 17, 2010).

In Quon, SCOTUS dodged the Fourth Amendment issues presented by new technologies. It issued a narrow holding that in the context of a workplace search, the review of the texts was not an unreasonable Fourth Amendment search. Id. at *14.

What does Quon mean for the future of the recent jewel of the Ninth’s Fourth Amendment law, Comprehensive Drug Testing? Justice Scalia, for one, seems ready to tackle the case: “Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice . . . The-times-they-are-a-changin' is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.." Id. at *15 (Scalia, J. concurring).


Image of the Hon. Susan Graber from http://www.law.gwu.edu/News/newsstories/Pages/2010_VanVleck.aspx

Steven Kalar, Senior Litigator N.D. Cal. FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org


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Case o' The Week: The Fourth, the Ninth, and the Tenth: New 4th Amendment Standing Rule in Ninth Circuit, SDI Future Health

In a case that presents more Fourth Amendment issues than a CrimPro exam, the Ninth Circuit imports a Tenth Circuit test to create a new rule for gauging the standing of corporate employees to challenge a search within a business. United States v. SDI Future Health, Inc.,__ F.3d __, No. 07-10261, 2009 WL 174910 (9th Cir. Jan. 27, 2009), decision available here.

A must-read for white collar folks.

Players: Decision by Judge Diarmuid F. O’Scannlain (left), joined by Judges Hawkins and McKeown.

Facts: Feds suspected Medicare and tax fraud within SDI Future Health Services, and got a search warrant for the company. Id. at *1. The corporate-executive defendants successfully challenged this search when they were later prosecuted. Id. at *2. The government took an interlocutory appeal. Id. at *3.

Issue(s): “We must decide whether corporate executives may challenge a police search of company premises not reserved for the executives’ exclusive use.” Id. at *1. “The government . . . argues . . that [the defendants] lack standing to challenge the search and seizure of materials from SDI’s premises. According to the government, the mere ownership and management of SDI, and the steps SDI took to preserve the security of its business files, are inadequate to support the conclusion that [the corporate executive defendants] personally had an expectation of privacy in the search areas and seized materials.” Id. at *3. “[T]his case presents the novel issue of the extent to which a business employee may have standing to challenge a search of business premises generally.” Id.

Held: “[W]e conclude that, except in the case of a small, family-run business over which an individual exercises daily management and control, an individual challenging a search of workplace areas beyond his own internal office must generally show some personal connection to the places searched and the materials seized. To adapt [United States v.] Anderson, [154 F/3d 1225, 1230-32 (10th Cir. 1998)] although all the circumstances remain relevant, we will specifically determine the strength of such personal connection with reference to the following factors: (1) whether the item seized is personal property or otherwise kept in a private place separate from other work-related material; (2) whether the defendant had custody or immediate control of the item when officers seized it; and (3) whether the defendant took precautions on his own behalf to secure the place searched or things seized from any interference without his authorization. Absent such a personal connection or exclusive use, a defendant cannot establish standing for Fourth Amendment purposes to challenge the search of a workplace beyond his internal office.” Id. at *5 (footnotes omitted). “The district court’s grant of the motion to suppress must be reversed and the matter remanded for further fact-finding.” Id. at *7.

Of Note: The new rule of SDI is an imported 10th Circuit standing test. There are, however, many additional Fourth Amendment sub-issues in the decision. Judge O’Scannlain discusses the incorporation of affidavits into search warrants – and finds that the affidavit was incorporated in this warrant. Id. at *8-*9. The decision also explains the difference between “particularity” and “overbreadth” in a search warrant challenge – and finds that several categories of the warrant were in fact overbroad. Id. at *10. Finally, the opinion expounds on severance of a search warrant, allowing for a partial suppression of materials seized from overbroad categories of the warrant. Id. at *13-*14. All in all, an expansive Fourth Amendment decision.

How to Use: White-collar counsel (and P.D.s who inherit these clients when retainers are tapped) will want to read SDI carefully. Note that the decision doesn’t strip corporate executives of all standing to challenge a search of a business: here, the executive-defendants still had “standing to challenge the admission of any evidence obtained from their own, personal, internal offices.” Id. at *7. Also, the opinion’s many footnotes merit close attention. For example, notes six and eight concede that these new standing factors are not exclusive. Id. at *5-*6, nn. 6 & 8.

For Further Reading: SDI was the most important case of the week: Quon, the most interesting to read. The panel for the great Quon v. Arch Wireless decision (cops and pager searches) fended-off an en banc attempt, prompting a dissent from the denial of rehearing en banc by Judge Ikuta (right). This in turn sparked a blistering “concurrence” in the denial of rehearing en banc by Judge Kim Wardlaw (left). See Judge Wardlaw's concurrence here.

Here’s Judge Wardlaw’s memorable first line: “No poet ever interpreted nature as freely as Judge Ikuta interprets the record on this appeal.” Id.




Image of the Hon. Diarmuid O'Scannlain from http://law.lclark.edu/org/bov/oscannlain.html. Image of the Hon. Sandra Ikuta from http://ms-jd.org/blogs/212. Image of the Hon. Kim Wardlaw from http://www.abovethelaw.com/2008/02/

Steven Kalar, Senior Litigator, N.D. Cal. FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org

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Case o' The Week: Defense 45 / Gov't 8 (but Lazarenko still gets nine . . .)

Years of litigation, millions of dollars of investigation, government "depositions" under sketchy circumstances in Russia, and the feds end up losing 45 out of 53 counts against Pavel Ivanovich Lazarenko, former Prime Minister of Ukraine? United States v. Lazarenko, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 4368219 (9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2008), decision available here.

A remarkable effort by some of the best of California's defense bar.

Unfortunately for Mr. Lazarenko (left, leaving the SF federal building) even with an additional six counts knocked by the Ninth, the remaining eight counts of conviction make his nine year sentence a step closer.

Players: SF Giants Dennis Riordan, Doron Weinberg, and Donald Horgan for Mr. Lazarenko. Opinion by Judge McKeown, joined by Judges Tashima and Gould.

Facts: Lazaranko was the former prime minister of Ukraine. Id. at *1. His “involvement” in businesses was actually extortion, alleged the US government. Id. Because the money hit US accounts, Lazaranko was charged in SF with a 53-count indictment alleging conspiracy, money laundering, wire fraud, and interstate transportation of stolen property. Id. He was convicted after trial of fourteen counts, and appealed. Id.

Issue(s): (One among many): “Lazarenko also appeals the denial of his Rule 33 motion for a new trial. He argues that the government indicted him on [one specific set of] charges, knowing that the charges could not be proven, and then, after the directed verdict of acquittal, used the evidence from [this alleged] scheme against him in its closing argument, in violation of the doctrine of retroactive misjoinder. He asserts that he was denied the opportunity to respond in his own closing argument to the government's misleading statements.” Id. at 14 (footnote omitted).

Held: “[W]e reject the government’s contention that we have limited the doctrine of retroactive misjoinder only to cases where there is more than one defendant.” Id. at *15. “[T]he doctrine of prejudicial spillover or retroactive misjoinder may apply to a case where there is only one defendant.” Id.

“Invoking the three-factor test that the Second Circuit developed in Vebeliunas, the district court concluded that Lazarenko was not prejudiced by the now-dismissed charges. Under the Vebeliunas test, the court considers:

(1) whether the evidence was so inflammatory that it would tend to cause the jury to convict on the remaining counts;

(2) the degree of overlap and similarity between the dismissed and remaining counts; and

(3) a general assessment of the strength of the government's case on the remaining counts . . .

These factors reasonably address concerns about prejudicial spillover. We adopt these factors and add to them the factors we identified in Cuozzo - whether the trial court diligently instructed the jury and whether there is evidence, such as the jury's rendering of selective verdicts, to indicate that the jury compartmentalized the evidence.” Id. at *16.

“The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Lazarenko a new trial based on prejudicial misjoinder.” Id.

Of Note: What is “retroactive misjoinder?” “ ‘Retroactive misjoinder’ arises where joinder of multiple counts was proper initially, but later developments- such as a district court's dismissal of some counts for lack of evidence or an appellate court's reversal of less than all convictions-render the initial joinder improper. In this Circuit, ‘[t]o invoke retroactive misjoinder,’ a defendant ‘must show compelling prejudice.’ Prejudicial spillover from evidence used to obtain a conviction subsequently reversed on appeal may constitute compelling prejudice.” Id. at *14.

How to Use: Lazarenko provides new rules for retroactive misjoinder:

1. the principle can apply to single defendants, and

2. there is a new multi-factor test for prejudicial spillover. It will be the lead decision on the concept.

The opinion has many other important holdings as well, however. This decision discusses “constructive amendments” – and calls out the government’s “shift in theory.” Id. at *6. It finds too great a temporal break to uphold wire fraud allegations, when funds were wired years after the fraud. Id. at *8. And, unfortunately, it refuses to demand a particularity requirement for the specific foreign statutes violated, when those foreign crimes were the bases of money laundering, wire fraud, and transportation of stolen money counts. Id. at *6.

An important read for white-collar defense.

For Further Reading: Павло Івáнович Лазарéнко, Pavlo Ivanovych Lazarenko, has lead a colorful life that has sparked a great deal of litigation. See wikipedia entry here. In the present case, he was sentenced to nine years, with a $10 million fine. See New York Times article here.

Long before this appeal of the convictions hit the Ninth, a different panel (including Justice O’Connor) issued a pretty controversial ruling on the criminal forfeiture aspects of the case. See blog on United States, Liquidators v. Lazarenko here.


Photo of Mr. Lazarenko leaving the San Francisco federal building from http://blog.kievukraine.info/4129.jpg


Steven Kalar, Senior Litigator, N.D. Cal. FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org


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Case o' The Week: Beware of the Swedish Drop, Stringer

Portland Chief District Judge Ancer Haggerty (left) writes a compelling decision detailing how the Oregon United States Attorney's Office abused civil SEC proceedings while it really developed its criminal case, and dismisses the indictment. Great stuff; brims with righteous indignation and a cause for much celebration -- until it was reversed in a very disappointing decision from the Ninth. United States v. Stringer III, __ F.3d __, 2008 WL 901563 (9th Cir. April 4, 2008) (decision available here).

Players: Judge Schroeder authors; Silverman & Bybee.

Facts: The SEC began investigation of a camera company, then starting working with a USAO – without revealing the cooperation to counsel for the company or defendants. Id. at *1 - *2. The SEC did provide a stock form, the “1662,” that warned evidence would be shared with prosecutors. Id. at *3. SEC counsel, however, refused to give a straight answer when asked if criminal proceedings were underway. Id. at *3-*4.

Meanwhile, one defense counsel represented several individuals and the company. Id. at *4. To curry favor for the company she disclosed incriminating information to the SEC about the (intriguing-sounding) “Swedish Drop Shipment” – information that she had learned from her representation of one of the individuals. Id. at *4. Predictably, the “Swedish Drop” showed up in the later criminal indictment against the individual defendant. Id. at *5. The district court dismissed the indictment.

Issue(s): 1. Fifth Amendment: “The defendants argue that the district court properly held that the use of the evidence obtained by the SEC in a criminal prosecution would violate defendants’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at *6.

2. Due Process: “The defendants next contend that the district court properly concluded that the government used the civil investigation solely to obtain evidence for a subsequent criminal prosecution, in violation of due process.” Id. at *7.

3. Evidence from Conflicted Attorney: “The district court concluded that the government violated defendant Samper’s due process rights when it obtained evidence about the ‘Swedish Drop Shipment’ from Samper’s attorney, knowing that she had a conflict of interest.” Id. at *10.

Held: 1. Fifth Amendment: “The SEC Form 1662 used in this case alerts SEC investigative witnesses that the information can be used in a criminal proceeding. Defendants were on sufficient notice, and so were their attorneys . . . . Defendants have forfeited any claims that the use of their testimony against them in the criminal proceedings violates their privilege against self-incrimination.” Id. at *7 (internal citation and quotations omitted);

2. Due Process: “It is significant to our analysis that the SEC began its civil investigation first and brought in the U.S. Attorney later . . . . We must conclude the SEC interviewed the defendants in support of a bona fide civil investigation. There was no violation of due process.” Id. at *8.

3. Evidence from Conflicted Attorney: “We have held that the government’s asking a defendant’s former attorney to turn over privileged information does not constitute deliberate intrusion on the part of the government when the attorney complies . . . For similar reasons, there was no deliberate government interference here.” Id. at *11.

Of Note: The tone of Stringer is remarkable – it is so flat, and so placid, that it reads like an opinion on a contract dispute. Where’s the, “while we are troubled by the conduct of government, we nevertheless conclude . . . .?”

For a thoughtful and forceful discussion on really happened in the case, read District Judge Haggerty’s decision that was reversed by the Ninth: 408 F. Supp. 2d 1083 (D. Or. 2006). Judge Haggerty lays out in great detail how the SEC was used as a stalking horse by AUSAs. “The USAO spent years hiding behind the civil investigation to obtain evidence, avoid criminal discovery rules, and avoid constitutional protections.” Id. at 1089. The dissonance between the facts and tenor of Haggerty’s decision, and the soothing defense of the SEC in the Ninth’s decision, is striking.

How to Use: For better or worse, Stringer is the lead Ninth Circuit case on the relationship between parallel civil and criminal prosecutions, and when that relationship crosses the due process line. It is an interesting idea for other contexts as well – like ICE investigations that are fronts for § 1001 (false statement) prosecutions. Id. at *6.

For Further Reading: After Stringer, there’s a lot of white collar folks spending a lovely spring weekend inside, reading and re-reading SEC Form 1662 and wondering about that last SEC deposition. To review this masterpiece yourself, visit the SEC webpage here.



Steven Kalar, Senior Litigator N.D. Cal. FPD. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org

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