Case o' The Week: Silver clouds and black linings - Rodriguez and Review of Title III Wiretap Applications and Orders
The good news? The Ninth
imposes a new (and higher) two-step standard on the district courts, when reviewing Title III
wiretap applications and orders.
United States v. Rodriguez, 2017 WL
971809 (9th Cir. Mar. 14, 2017), decision available here.
Players:
Decision by visiting D.C. District Judge Friedman, joined by Judges Paez and
Tashima.
Facts: Several district judges granted wiretap orders targeting
Rodriguez and an alleged Mexican Mafia drug conspiracy.
Drug charges were eventually filed
in the court of the third, presiding district judge. The third DJ reviewed the
entire wiretap motion using only the (deferential) abuse of discretion standard,
then denied the motion. Id. at *4.
The
government filed an § 851 prior. Id.
at *8-*9. Rodriguez was convicted after a trial and was sentenced to 600 months.
Id. at *1.
Issue(s): “[Rodriguez] argues that the district court erred
because it applied the incorrect standard of review when deciding his motion to
suppress and that the government's wiretap application did not include a full
and complete statement of facts as required by 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1)(c).” Id. at *1.
“[ ] Rodriguez
argues that the district court erred by deciding his motion to suppress under
an abuse of discretion standard and improperly deferring to the issuing judge,
rather than conducting its own independent review of whether the wiretap affidavits
contained a full and complete statement of facts sufficient to satisfy 18 U.S.C.
§ 2518(1)(c).” Id. at *3.
Held: “When
we review a district court’s decision on a motion to suppress wiretap evidence,
we determine de novo whether the information in an affiant’s application for a
wiretap amounts to ‘a full and complete statement as to whether or not other
investigative procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably
appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous. . . . If the
wiretap application meets the requirements of § 2518(1)(c), then the Court
reviews for abuse of discretion the issuing court’s finding that the wiretap
was necessary under § 2518(3)(c) and its decision to grant the wiretap.” Id. at *3.
“We conclude
that district courts should apply the Ninth Circuit’s two-step approach when
considering a motion to suppress wiretap evidence. Therefore, a reviewing
district court judge must review de novo whether the application for a wiretap
contains a full and complete statement as to whether or not other investigative
procedures have been tried and failed or why they reasonably appear to be
unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous . . . . If the wiretap
application meets these requirements . . ., then the district court judge
should review for abuse of discretion the issuing judge’s conclusion that the
wiretap was necessary.” Id. at *4
(internal quotations and citations omitted).
Of Note: The good news is that Rodriguez’s two-step process is a far better approach than the more
deferential review often applied by district courts. Moreover, the Ninth questions the lack of meaningful factual review below, and the DJ's improper deference to the “half century of judicial experience” of the judges who issued the Title
III orders. Id. at *4.
The bad news is that the Ninth doesn’t
remand. Instead, the Court applies this two-step approach and mows down a variety
of wiretap factual challenges: failure to disclose a search condition in the
application, boilerplate language, and a brief surveillance period before
wiretaps were sought. Id. at *5-*9.
For better or worse, Rodriguez’s mixed bag is now must-read
before tackling a Title III challenge in the Ninth.
How to Use:
Section 851 of Title 21 sets forth a detailed procedure for alleging priors
triggering mand-mins in a drug case. In a very rare outcome, the Ninth reverses
and remands because Rodriguez’s § 851 hearing was botched. Id. at *12.
Judge Friedman gives a detailed description
of the requirements for alleging a prior, what has to happen during the § 851
hearing, and the failure to meet the statutory requirements here.
As we ponder
a future with more of these miserable § 851 proceedings, Rodriguez is a good place to start.
For Further
Reading: Four years ago,
NorCal’s own Josh Cohen asked if Title III was dead after the Rajaratnam white
collar wiretap. See Josh A. Cohen, Is
Title III Dead? The Future of Wiretap Challenges in the Wake of Rajaratnam,
The Champion, available here.
Interesting to mull this helpful article again in light of Rodriguez, and query how Josh’s call for a “collective prayer – for
individuals’ privacy” is being answered.
For defense bar Norteños, this is a
particularly pressing question. In the last several years, the Northern District of California has had an extraordinary wiretap boom (clustered
largely in Oakland). See “For Further
Reading” here.
The Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts reports
wiretap data in July: check back this summer to see if the Feds’ eavesdropping addiction
continues unabated. See AO stat link here.
Image
of Uncle Sam wiretap cartoon from http://counter-surveillance-devices.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/06/uncle_sam_wiretap.jpg
Steven
Kalar, Federal Public Defender N.D. Cal. Website at www.ndcalfpd.org
.
Labels: Drug prior predicates, Section 851, Title III, Wiretaps
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