1. US v. Chen, No. 20-50333 (9-14-22)(Navarro w/Rawlinson & Christen). “We hold that a district court may consider the First Step’s non-retroactive changes to sentencing law, in combination with other factors particular to the individual defendant, when determining whether extraordinary and compelling reasons exist for a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A).” p. 3.

The issue was stacked 924(c)s. The sentencing court can consider the change in law.

Congrats to Joshua Weiss & Kathryn Young, Deputy FPDs, Cal C (L.A.).

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/14/20-50333.pdf

2.  US v. Fowler, No. 21-30172 (9-13-22)(Miller w/Ikuta & Pregerson). Affirming denial of a suppression motion, the 9th upheld the cross-deputization of a Montana state trooper to enforce tribal law when there is a gap in the jurisdictions. The trooper stopped the defendant, an Indian, on a highway cutting through the reservation. The cross-deputization agreement was valid. The fact the deputy did not carry an identification card which clearly violates the agreement did not rise to a serious enough violation to cause the sovereign parties to seek a remedy.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/13/21-30172.pdf

3. US v. Montoya, No. 21-50129 (9-13-22)(Lee w/Ikuta; concurrence by Forrest). The 9th wouldn’t let appellant withdraw her guilty plea. The appellant argued the court’s saying it “rejected” a non-binding sentencing recommendation transformed the plea to an 11(c)(1)(C). “No,” says the 9th; the word didn’t make it what it wasn’t. The 9th also held failing to orally recite the standard conditions was not err. US v Napier, 463 F.3d 1040 (9th Cir 2006) does not require it. At the COP colloquy, the court’s failure to say the defendant had a right to a jury trial did not affect her rights. Concurring, Forrest regards Napier as wrong. The “standard” conditions are too broad a definition.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/09/13/21-50129.pdf

1. US v. Latu, No. 19-10069 (Nguyen w/Wardlaw & Owens). The 9^th affirms a conviction for Assault resulting in serious bodily injury that occurred at a federal detention center. The victim, also a detainee, refused to testify. His statements as to the injuries and pain came in, over a Crawford confrontation objection, because the statements fit into a hearsay exception (medical treatment) and they were given in medical treatment as opposed to questioning or law enforcement. This was true even though the medical nurse was a BOP employee. The primary purpose was treatment for traumatic injuries and medical care. Of note, the 9^th emphatically states it is not adopting a categorical rule or presumption that all statements to medical staff or during treatment is admissible and not Crawford barred. The 9^th emphasizes sometimes, the statements are testimonial and subject to Crawford. The factors here are the role of the nurse (treatment and not questioning), the trauma, and the informality.

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/31/19-10069.pdf

 

2. Wright v. Alaska, No. 19-35543 (8-31-22)(Murguia w/Nelson; concurrence by Rawlinson). Custody on a failure to register as a sex offender charge  is not “custody” for habeas jurisdiction to challenge underlying state convictions that gave rise to the requirement to register. The Supreme Court dealt with the argument in Alaska v. Wright, 141 S. Ct 1467 (2021). Petitioner’s attempt here to argue a “restraint-on-liberty” condition by registration also fails. He was not in custody. Rawlinson concurs, stating the Court’s per curium decision dealt with both theories and the “rehash’ in this opinion was not necessary.

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/31/19-35543.pdf

US v. Anderson, No. 20-50207 (8-25-22)(Rawlinson w/Owens; dissent by Fletcher). The 9th considers whether a contracted private security guard threatened by defendant is an “official” under 18 USC 115 through a cross reference to 1114 which extends to those assisting officials.  The majority says “yes,” while acknowledging the ambiguity and confusion in the statute. The majority concludes the term “official” in 115 is not meant as a limitation. The dissent, Fletcher, says: yes it should. The statute is ambiguous and the language must be read as a limitation. It should not apply to this guard as an “official.” The Rule 29 should be granted. The majority joins the 3rd and 8th Circuits.

Interesting statutory issue and one that may have appeal to SCOTUS.

Righteous fight by Gia Kim, Deputy Public Defender, Cal Central (Los Angeles).  

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/25/20-50207.pdf

 

1. Nguyen v. Frauenheim, No. 20-56284 (8-22-22)(M. Smith w/Bade & VanDyke). The 9^th affirms denial of a habeas petition, finding no Batson violation. The Batson challenge went to gender and mixed race. The 9^th reiterates that Teague bars new rules being established in habeas. As such, looking at a class of Hispanic women would be a new class (Hispanic and gender). There was also no Batson violation as to the Hispanic juror.

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/22/20-56284.pdf

 

2. US v. Ramirez-Ramirez, No. 21-10127 (8-22-22)(Paez w/Hawkins & Watford). Summary by Ryan Moore, AFPD (Appeals), D. AZ, who argued the case: “The CA9 holds on plain error that the 6A public-trial right applies to the phase of announcing guilt in a bench trial. Only the CA2 so held previously. The district court announced its findings of guilt about a week after the bench trial only in writing, while the defendant sat in jail. The panel held that the 6A requires findings of guilt be made in open court, even when the factfinder is the judge. Although the panel also held that the district court’s later reiteration of its findings at sentencing satisfied the 6A’s open-court requirement, it nonetheless remanded for specific findings of fact because the district court had denied as untimely a request for specific findings made after the written announcement of guilt, which was “legally insufficient.” Unfortunately, the plain error standard doomed what the panel called “a strong argument” that the guilt by email scheme also violated the rights to be present under the 5A and Rule 43(a). And we really should have gotten a new trial for the 6A violation, in my opinion, because a mere reiteration at sentencing of a decision made long after the judge has moved on is not a substitute for the moment of truth when the judge faces a defendant in trial and makes/announces the decision in open court. But the caselaw isn’t great on the remedy for this structural error and a new trial was always a longshot.”

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/22/21-10127.pdf

 

3. US v. Jaimez, No. 19-50253 (8-23-22)(Bress w/Fitzwater; Concurrence/dissent by Owens). The 9^th affirms convictions for RICO, money laundering, and conspiracy. There was sufficient evidence. Owens dissents on money laundering, arguing the defendant, a low level “foot soldier,” did not know the purpose of the money laundering actions was to conceal financial transactions.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/23/19-50253.pdf 

Crespin v. Ryan, No. 18-15073 (8-19-22)(Hurwitz w/Hawkins & M. Smith). The 9^th affirms a conditional grant of habeas. This presents a Miller claim, narrowed under Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct 1307 (2021). Petitioner was 16 when charged with a capital offense. He pled to LWOP, pre-Miller. The 9^th held he could challenge post-conviction. The 9^th then held that Miller and Jones both require the court to exercise its discretion. Here, the trial court stated he had no discretion in sentencing and had to impose LWOP. The 9^th rejects the State’s argument that the court could have rejected the plea. Rejection is not discretion in sentencing, and did not comply with Miller.

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/19/18-15073.pdf

1. US v. Rodriguez, No. 21-50108 (8-17-22)(M. Smith w/Bade; concurrence by VanDyke). The 9^th remands for resentencing. In sentencing for importation, the court erred in denying a minor role adjustment by misapplying the factors set out in 3B1.2(b). In denying the adjustment, the court failed to recognize the comparison is with an average participant in a particular conspiracy or enterprise; failed to consider a recruiter’s culpability in luring the defendant; failed to consider the degree of involvement in the factors; and failed to consider the totality of circumstances. The court tended to have a stark choice about applicability.  Upon resentencing, as to certain factors, the 9^th instructs the court to focus on the scope of defendant’s knowledge of the entire criminal enterprise (which was limited); the fact he was paid a discrete amount rather than a percentage; and the receiving of instructions does not mean one plans or organizations conduct.

Concurring, VanDyke agrees with the remand. He writes to stress a court can consider evidence beyond the five factors listed in 3B1.2(b). He also states that running large quantities of drugs across the border can indicate a knowledge of participants involved.

This is a good case for use of “minor role” and the factored approach.

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/17/21-50108.pdf

 

2. US v. Carter, No. 19-10411(8-17-22)(Bea w/Murguia & Berzon). This is a First Step Act issue about what changes and facts can be considered in using discretion to reduce a sentence in resentencing. The 9^th states that Concepcion v US, 142 S. Ct 2389 (2022) allows (1) district courts to examine intervening changes in the law or fact in exercising discretion in reducing a sentence; (2) the court must consider nonfrivolous arguments in exercising discretion, and so changes of fact can be considered; and (3) the court must explain its reasoning. The 9^th holds Concepcion abrogates 9^th precedent in US v. Kelly, 962 F. 3d 470 (9^th Cir. 2020). Kelly limited the First Step Act to sections 2 and 3 of the Fair Sentencing Act and the changes there. Concepcion expands the scope.

Congrats to David Porter, AFPD, Cal E (Sacramento).

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/17/19-10411.pdf

 

US v. Magdaleno, No. 20-10390 (8-11-22)(Clifton w/M. Smith & Reiss). Siblings don’t qualify as an “intimate familial relationship”? At least not under plain error, and on this record, which involves a SR condition for the defendant, a member of the East Las Casitas Norteno street gang, not to associate with fellow gang members. His siblings and half-siblings are members of the gang. The 9^th  considers Wolf Child, which holds that certain close family ties are fundamental liberty interests that need special findings and proof. The relationship with brothers and half-brothers, on this record, did not rise to such a relationship. The court did not procedurally err by failing to make certain findings; and did not err in imposing this condition on the record.

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/11/20-10390.pdf

1. Fauber v. Davis, No. 17-99001 (8-5-22)(Bress w/Forrest; dissent by Watford). The 9^th affirms denial of a capital habeas. Under AEDPA deference, the 9^th finds no IAC when counsel failed to object to prosecutorial vouching. In closing,  the prosecutor read the cooperating witness’s plea agreement which state the prosecutor and court would assess testimony for truthfulness.

More concerning, the majority found no error in the exclusion from mitigation the State’s plea offer to life. Petitioner sought to introduce to counter the argument of future dangerousness. The majority concludes there is no clearly established federal constitutional law that holds an unaccepted plea is mitigating evidence. Even if it were, the majority concludes exclusion was not prejudicial.

Dissenting, Watford points to the need to counter the prosecutor’s full-throated argument the petitioner would kill again  if given LWOP. Watford argues federal law is clear on this point and it is not harmless.

Righteous fight by Deputy Fed Defenders John Crouchley & Ajay Kusnoor, Cal Central (Los Angeles).

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/05/17-99001.pdf

 

2. Montiel v. Chappell, No. 15-99000 (Friedland w/Fletcher & Hurwitz)(8-5-22). The 9^th affirms denial of a petitioner for IAC under AEDPA deference. The 9^th concludes, again, the state supreme court’s summary denial of a review petition was on the merits. Even assuming counsel was IAC for failing to present expert evidence of diminished capacity due to substance abuse and a history of substance abuse, the state court was reasonable in finding there was no prejudice.

 

https://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/opinions/2022/08/05/15-99000.pdf